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Abstract
Since the middle of the 1970’s, there has been considerable research about how to deal
with exhaustible natural resources which are essential to production. In the absence of
substitution possibilities, the finite stock of these resources acts as a limiting factor
to continued growth of output and hence consumption possibilities. In our first
chapter, we combine a finite natural resource and human capital in the production
function and look at the possibility of maintaining a non-declining or sustainable level
of consumption for an infinite horizon. Our results show that the return to human
capital accumulation plays a key role in ensuring this objective. In our model without
physical capital, we obtain a similar result where this return must be such that the
fraction of time devoted to acquiring human capital each period is at least as much
as the share of natural resources in output.
Our second chapter focuses on the transition from a relatively cheap exhaustible
natural resource (coal, gasoline) to an expensive alternative technology assumed to be
in nearly unlimited supply (wind, solar). Due to significant cost differences between
fossil-fuel based energy sources and these alternative (backstop) technologies, their use
is not as widespread. Public subsidies to research can however bring about innovation
through cheaper production techniques which would significantly reduce the operating
costs of these backstop technologies. But without sufficient incentives for investment
and patent protections, individual firms typically underinvest in backstop technologies
relative to the socially optimal level. In our paper, we find that this underinvestment
in the backstop also leads to an under-extraction of the exhaustible natural resource.
This imply firms would conserve the natural resource for too long and switch later
v
to the alternative technology relative to the socially optimal solution. We extend
the chapter to include pollution as a flow variable. Pollution from aggregate use of
the natural resource is seen to not affect the behavior of an individual firm whereas
it significantly affects that of the social planner. For relatively low pollution cost
values, the socially optimal solution involves less investment in the backstop and
conserving the natural resource for a longer period compared to the case without
pollution. For higher values of the pollution cost, the social planner invests more in
the backstop each period and switches sooner to the backstop compared to the case
without pollution. In some situations, this may involve leaving behind some stock of
the natural resource in the ground.
The third chapter introduces pollution (a stock variable) through a deterioration
of environmental quality. The structure of the second chapter is maintained here.
Comparing the true pollution cost of the resource (in terms of a poor environmental
quality) and the cost of the backstop technology, it is possible for the natural resource
to be relatively more expensive. This arises in a situation of a very dirty environmen-
tal quality where the additional benefit from a slightly better environment exceeds
the cost of the alternative cleaner technology. In this case, the optimal solution in-
volves using the backstop at first for a few periods before making a discrete jump to a
constant mix of using both the resource and the backstop technology. Here the econ-
omy settles at a steady state of environmental quality. It similarly follows that when
the quality of the environment is relatively clean to begin with, the optimal solution
involves starting with the cheaper but polluting natural resource before switching to
a constant mix of using both the energy sources.
vi
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Chapter 1
A note on feasible per capita consumption
levels in the face of diminishing natural
resources
Abstract
Since the middle of the 1970’s, there has been considerable research
about how to deal with exhaustible natural resources which are essential to
production. In the absence of substitution possibilities, the finite stock of
these resources acts as a limiting factor to continued growth of output and
hence consumption possibilities. Here we combine a finite natural resource
with human capital in the production function and look at the possibility
of maintaining a non-declining or sustainable level of consumption each
period for an extended finite horizon and up to infinity. For simplicity,
we begin by analyzing the best constant rate of extraction of the resource
and constant fraction of time devoted to human capital accumulation
that would be necessary to maintain output or consumption at a constant
level for an infinite horizon. Our results show that it is indeed possible for
consumption to be sustainable if we extract the resource and accumulate
human capital in reasonable proportions each period. At the optimum
solution, the parameter for productivity of human capital only affects
the fraction of time devoted to human capital accumulation but not the
proportion of resources extracted at each period.
1
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we look at constant time paths for the rate of human capital accumu-
lation and the rate of extraction for an exhaustible resource which would ensure a
sustainable level of consumption per capita for an infinite horizon. We define sus-
tainability in per capita consumption as a non-declining path for which consumption
rises at a constant rate or at least stays at a constant level. In the presence of
non-renewable resources such as oil and coal without which we cannot have gasoline
and most of the electricity that is being generated today, the question arises as to
what will happen to their production levels once these resources are exhausted. This
work shows that production and hence consumption can be maintained at a positive
non-decreasing level forever if there is some government mandated policy which sets
the rate of human capital accumulation and resource extraction at a fixed level from
today up to infinity. Using a simple model with production being carried out with hu-
man capital,labor and a non-renewable resource, we show that production levels can
be sustained indefinitely if there is some policy which sets the rate of human capital
accumulation and the rate of non-renewable resource extraction at a constant value
from the initial period. This shows that at least there is a possibility of maintaining a
constant level of per capita consumption forever and that exhaustible resources may
not prove to be a constraint when sustainability issues are considered. We employ this
simplistic model to establish a baseline on which more complex models can be built
and a strategy with which governments might operate. Our model does not engage
physical capital and investment which is a real world situation and can thus be a very
natural extension. But this work provides an useful insight about the substitution
possibility between an exhaustible resource and human capital which can guarantee
per capita consumption to be non-decreasing for a long enough horizon.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) were one of the first to analyze that the presence of
non-renewable natural resources as an essential input in production could prove to
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be a constraint for long-run growth in consumption possibilities. As the marginal
product of the exhaustible resource tends to infinity in the limit due to diminishing
resource use, it is not optimal to leave any of it in the ground forever. Thus, as the
authors recommend, along an optimal policy, the flow of the exhaustible resource
into production from a finite given initial stock should be positive. The optimum
exists as long as there is a positive rate of discount. This leads to the classic result
of a single-peaked optimal consumption profile which rises and then falls to zero
asymptotically as time goes to infinity. The optimal profile for the resource flow into
production will be downward sloping and would also tend to zero in the limit. Solow
(1974), instead of looking at the optimal consumption profile in the presence of a
positive rate of discount, adopts a max-min criterion to analyze the maximum level
of positive per capita consumption that could be maintained forever. The condition
for consumption to be sustainable for an infinite period is that the share of physical
capital in the production function should exceed that of the non-renewable resource.
With continued physical capital accumulation at a sufficiently fast rate, the capital-
labor ratio tends to infinity even if the resource-labor ratio tends to zero when there
is no population growth. This conclusion is similar to that derived in Dasgupta and
Heal (1979). Stiglitz (1974) determines the steady state paths of consumption with
an exhaustible resource stock and exogenously given rates of population growth and
technological progress. He finds that along any path for which consumption grows at
a constant rate, it would have a constant savings rate asymptotically and that the rate
of change of input of the natural resource and the resource flow-stock ratio would tend
to a constant value. When there is no technological progress or population growth,
the necessary and sufficient condition for a constant level of consumption along any
efficient path is that the share of the exhaustible resource in production should be less
than that of the reproducible physical capital. The share of the exhaustible resource,
in turn, equals the savings rate in the steady state.
3
Lucas (1988)in a seminal contribution, introduced the external effect of human
capital in the standard neo-classical framework. The idea was that each individual
in the economy was endowed with human capital or a skill level and that the “av-
erage level of skill or human capital” for the economy had a postive external effect
on production. This external effect of human capital drives a wedge between the
optimum and the competitive equilibrium paths. Along an optimal path, the social
planner takes into account that individual human capital equals the average human
capital for the economy as a whole whereas for a competitive equilibrium, the path
of the average level of skill or human capital is taken as given much like an exogenous
technology path. Analyzing the balanced growth paths of both systems, the author
finds no difference between the steady state growth rates of per capita consumption
or physical capital in the model. The shares of labor, the external effect of human
capital and the steady state growth rate of human capital plays the role of an ex-
ogenous technological change in this case. Thus the model predicts sustained growth
in per capita consumption whether or not the external effect of human capital is
positive. But the steady state growth rates of human capital along the efficient or
competitive equilibrium paths differ according to the elasticity of the marginal utility
of consumption and the discount rate. The difference between these steady state
growth rates narrows for a small external effect of human capital and a low rate of
discount.The optimal balanced growth rate of human capital, however, increases with
the effectiveness of investment in human capital and declines with the discount rate.
Following Lucas (1988), there have been many papers which try to tackle the
problem of non-renewable resources in the production function by including human
capital in the model. Barbier (1999), by modeling technological change as a function
of human capital engaged in the innovation sector, found that the optimum balanced
growth rate for per capita consumption depends positively on the production param-
eter of the knowledge sector and the total stock of human capital for the economy. At
4
the optimum steady state, the growth rate of per capita consumption falls with the
discount rate and the elasticity for the marginal utility of consumption. Thus the de-
pendence of an economy on exhaustible natural resources will not necessarily inhibit
long run steady state growth in per capita consumption if there is enough human
capital and a productive innovation sector. One of the key contributions of the pa-
per is that it also introduces a “constrained Romer-Stiglitz model” where the rate of
innovation or technical change depends negatively on the rate of resource utilization.
This is especially true in the case of developing economies where successive exhaus-
tion of the natural resource stock leads to tension and social conflict which can act
as a hindrance to technological progress. In this case, the optimal balanced growth
rate of the resource stock falls with the fraction of the total human capital employed
for innovation purposes. This not only raises the per capita optimal balanced growth
rate of consumption, but due to diminishing resource use, allows the resource stock
to be sustained for a longer period. Schou (2000) and Smulders (2004) found similar
results in that per capita consumption can be sustainable in the long run if there is
enough technical progress and low values of taste parameters such as the discount
rate and the coefficient of relative risk aversion. One of the main contributions of
Schou (2000) was introducing a negative externality in the form of pollution from
use of the non-renewable resource in production. The author finds that the long run
optimal growth rate of consumption increases with the pollution parameter. The
result is quite intuitive because the increased flow pollution generated from resource
use induces firms to conserve resources for the future which increases the long run
optimal growth rate of per capita consumption. Thus at least a positive level of per
capita consumption can be sustainable if resources can be conserved into the indef-
inite future. As Smulders (2004) showed, a positive long run growth in per capita
consumption can also be optimal if we have increasing returns to scale and enough
population growth.
5
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Finite Horizon
Output at any time t is produced according to the function
Y (t) = (u(t)h(t)L(t))αR(t)1−αha(t)γ (1.1)
At any time t, we assume that there are L identical individuals in the economy. We
abstract from population growth in the model. Here Y denotes output, u is the
fraction of non-leisure time a representative individual devotes to production and
(1− u) is the proportion of non-leisure time devoted to human capital accumulation.
h represents the individual stock of human capital so that uh is the total effective
human capital input per person. uhL thus captures the aggregate effective human
capital contribution in production. As in Lucas (1988), ha denotes the external effect
of the average level of human capital in the economy. With all identical individuals as
we assume for our purposes, h = ha holds. Following Lucas (1988), we also distinguish
between the “internal effect of human capital” which is simply the per capita human
capital or h and the above-mentioned “external effect of human capital.” R denotes
the flow of the non-renewable resource stock used in production. γ, α and (1−α) are
the output shares of the external effect of human capital, the effect of the aggregate
effective human capital and the flow of the non-renewable resource respectively.
The stock of the exhaustible resource in the initial period (time 0) is given as S0.
The resource is used each period in amounts R(t) in production. Thus the following
condition should be satisfied
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt ≤ S0 (1.2)
This non-renewable resource flow is extracted from its stock according to the law of
motion
6
S˙t = −R(t) (1.3)
As we extract the resource to be used in production each period, the stock of the
resource over time declines at the rate of the resource flow. We consider a constant-
rate plan in which the resource is extracted at a constant rate from the remaining
stock each period. Denoting this constant rate to be r and the stock of the remaining
resource to be S(t), we can write the following equation
R(t) = rS(t)
Thus for the initial period, we have, R0 = rS0. Combining the above two equations
we get the following expression
S˙t = −R(t) = −rS(t) (1.4)
As the constant rate of resource extraction r each period can also be expressed as
R(t)/S(t), it can be called the “resource-utilization ratio.”
In our model, the proportion of non-leisure time people devote to human capital
accumulation influences the level of human capital for the representative individual
next period. The stock of human capital next period also depends on its level in the
current period. The growth of human capital over periods is captured by the law of
motion
h˙t = δ(1− u(t))h(t) (1.5)
where (1− u) is the proportion of non-leisure time spent on human capital accumu-
lation. δ is a productivity parameter denoting the usefulness of the fraction of time
devoted to further acquire human capital. h0, the initial stock of human capital per
capita is assumed to be given.
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Previous literature by Barbier (1999), Schou (2000), Groth and Schou (2002)
and Smulders (2004) have shown that the rate of growth of the resource flow into
production is constant in the steady state and that it equals the negative of the
resource-utilization ratio r. Furthermore, in the steady state, the rate of growth of
the resource flow equals that of the stock of the resource. In the steady state, the
fraction of time devoted to work and human capital accumulation also converges to
a constant value.
Thus with a constant r and u in the steady state, we would have, for all t in our
model, constant values of the growth rates
gS = gR = −r (1.6)
and,
gh = δ(1− u) (1.7)
where gX = X˙X for any variable X.
Re-writing (1.1) using (1.4), (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7) and collecting terms we get
Y (t) = (uh0eghtL)α · (R0e−rt)1−α · (h0eght)γ
= (uL)α · h0α+γ · (rS0)1−α · e(δ(1−u)(α+γ)−(1−α)r)t
We can also write the above expression in a simplified form as
Y (t) = A(u, r)eX(u,r)t (1.8)
where A(u, r) = (uL)αh0α+γ(rS0)1−α and X(u, r) = δ(1−u)(α+γ)− (1−α)r. u and
r are treated as constants in our constant-rate plan. As L, S0 and h0 are given and
α and γ are parameters, it is obvious that for any positive growth in the model, we
would require X ≥ 0.
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We do not have savings in this model. For our purposes at present, we presume
that all of production goes into consumption. We use a simple log utility of the form
U(C(t)) = U(Y (t)) = ln(Y (t))
Using (1.8), we can re-write the above equation as
U(Y (t)) = ln(Y (t)) = ln(A(u, r)) +X(u, r)t (1.9)
We assume individuals discount future streams of utility at a constant rate. To
that end, we discount (1.9) over T periods to get
Z(T ) =
∫ T
0
[ln(A(u, r)) +X(u, r)t]e−ρtdt
= ln(A(u, r))
∫ T
0
e−ρtdt+X(u, r)
∫ T
0
e−ρttdt
where ρ represents the discount rate. Simplifying the above equation we obtain
Z(T ) = ln(A(u, r))(1− e
−ρT )
ρ
+X(u, r)[1− e
−ρT
ρ2
− Te
−ρT
ρ
] (1.10)
Maximizing (1.10) with respect to the control variables u and r, we get
u∗ = α
δ(α + γ) [
(1− e−ρT )ρ
1− e−ρT (1 + ρT ) ] (1.11)
and,
r∗ = (1− e
−ρT )ρ
1− e−ρT (1 + ρT ) (1.12)
where “∗”denotes the optimal solution and 0 < u < 1 and 0 < r < 1 are the feasibilty
constraints. Moreover we can see that
u∗ = α
δ(α + γ)r
∗ (1.13)
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In other words, at the optimum, individuals work a constant proportion of the rate of
resource utilization in the finite horizon case. This relation holds for any value of the
parameters of the model and the time horizon T . It can be shown that the solution
(u∗, r∗) satisfies the second-order conditions and so we have a unique optimum for
the function Z(T ).
We mentioned earlier that the condition for any positive growth in consumption
is given by X ≥ 0. Substituting the values of the optimum u and r found above, this
condition reduces to
δ ≥ ρ(1− e
−ρT )
(α + γ)[1− e−ρT (1 + ρT )] (1.14)
Thus, depending on the size of the productivity parameter for human capital, per
capita consumption can actually be increasing in this model or at least stay at a
constant level for all periods.
Using (1.11), (1.12) and (1.13) in X ≥ 0 we get,
α ≥ u (1.15)
which can also be written as, (1 − α) ≤ (1 − u). Thus to maintain a constant
consumption level, we would require (1− u) = (1− α). As (1− u) can be treated as
an investment in human capital in the model and (1− α) is the share of the natural
resource in production, the result is parallel to that obtained by Stiglitz (1974) for
maintaining a constant consumption level for all periods along an efficient path.
We can extend the idea of Stiglitz (1974) of an efficient path where the output
share of physical capital should be greater than that of the natural resource in pro-
duction. There is no physical capital in our model. However, with accumulation of
human capital, the effective labor input is reproducible like any physical capital in
the production process. Following Stiglitz (1974) for an efficient path, this would
imply
(1− α) < α (1.16)
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which means that α > 1/2. This seems quite reasonable as data on factor shares
suggest that the share of labor in output is greater than 50%.
Analyzing the optimal solutions for u and r given by 1.11) and (1.12), we see that
the optimal fraction of time devoted to production falls with an increase in either δ
or γ. This is because when the return to human capital accumulation increases with
a rise in δ, individuals want to spend more time in acquiring human capital at the
cost of fewer work hours. An increase in γ has the same effect as we consider a social
planner solution where the human capital level of the representative individual is the
same as the average level of human capital in the economy. We can summarize the
comparative static results as
∂u
∂δ
= −α
δ2(α + γ)B
∂u
∂γ
= −α
δ(α + γ)2
B
∂u
∂T
= αρ
δ(α + γ) [
1 + Te−ρT
1− e−ρT (1 + ρT ) −
(1− e−ρT )T 2ρe−ρT
(1− e−ρT (1 + ρT ))2 ]
∂r
∂T
= ρ[ 1 + Te
−ρT
1− e−ρT (1 + ρT ) −
(1− e−ρT )T 2ρe−ρT
(1− e−ρT (1 + ρT ))2 ] (1.17)
where B = ρ(1−e−ρT )1−e−ρT (1+ρT ) is assumed to be positive. We are not sure of the effects
of a rise in the share of effective labor in production α and the discount rate ρ on
work effort u as it can either be positive or negative depending on the size of the
parameters. From our results above we can also see that the optimum constant rate
of resource extraction r only depends on the discount rate ρ and the length of the
time horizon T . It is intuitive that as the time horizon increases, fraction of the
remaining resource stock extracted each period falls.
As an illustration, we maximize the expression for the discounted utility of output
given by (1.10) with respect to the controls u and r by varying the time horizon T
11
Table 1.1 Finite Horizon
T=10 T=20 T=30 T=40 T=50 T=60
δ=0.02 0.990.218
0.99
0.12
0.99
0.088
0.99
0.073
0.99
0.064
0.99
0.059
δ=0.04 0.990.218
0.99
0.12
0.99
0.088
0.99
0.073
0.99
0.064
0.99
0.059
δ=0.06 0.990.218
0.99
0.12
0.99
0.088
0.84
0.073
0.743
0.064
0.685
0.059
δ=0.08 0.990.218
0.99
0.12
0.76
0.088
0.63
0.073
0.557
0.064
0.513
0.059
δ=0.1 0.990.218
0.828
0.12
0.608
0.088
0.504
0.073
0.446
0.064
0.411
0.059
δ=0.12 0.990.218
0.69
0.12
0.507
0.088
0.42
0.073
0.372
0.064
0.342
0.059
δ=0.14 0.990.218
0.591
0.12
0.434
0.088
0.36
0.073
0.318
0.064
0.293
0.059
δ=0.16 0.9440.218
0.518
0.12
0.38
0.088
0.315
0.073
0.279
0.064
0.257
0.059
and the human capital productivity parameter δ. Using similar values as used by
Lucas (1988) and Schou (2000), we set α = 0.9, γ = 0.4 and ρ = 0.05. For the scale
parameters, we fix them arbitrarily at L = 1, h0 = 1 and S0 = 10 as these do not
show up in the maximizing values of u and r in (1.11) and (1.12). For the numerical
maximization problem, we restrict u and r to be in between its political boundaries
of 0.01 < u < 0.99 and 0.01 < r < 0.60. This is purely done in terms of a government
or social planner imposing limits on the fraction of time devoted to work and the
proportion of resources extracted each period. Finally, we set the starting values at
δ = 0.02 and T = 10 and vary them by increments of 0.02 and 10 respectively.
Table 1.1 summarizes the results. We are not concerned about the maximum
discounted value of output and so only report the optimal values of u and r. In
table 1.1, the first number in each of the cells corresponds to the optimal fraction of
non-leisure time devoted to work whereas the number below represents the optimal
rate of resource extraction or the resource utilization ratio. We can observe that the
constant proportional relation between u and r in (1.13) holds true for the results in
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the table. For the cases when δ = 0.02 and δ = 0.04, irrespective of the time horizon,
individuals devote the maximum fraction of time possible to work (99%) and none
to human capital accumulation. Returns to accumulating human capital are just too
low in these situations and individuals do not find it worthwhile to spend any fraction
of their time to accumulate human capital. Only when the productivity parameter
for human capital is above the rate of discount (5%), we get an interior solution
with people devoting their time to both production and human capital accumulation.
Intuitively, the proportion of time devoted to human capital accumulation becomes
positive for shorter and shorter time horizons with an increase in the productivity
parameter δ. For example, when δ equals 6%, individuals start accumulating human
capital for T ≥ 40 whereas for δ=8%, individuals devote at least 24% of their time
to human capital accumulation for a time horizon of 30 years or more. In the limit,
accumulating human capital for the shortest time horizon of 10 years only becomes
worthwhile when δ=16%.
For a given level of the productivity parameter (above the discount rate), an in-
crease in the length of the time horizon is associated with an increase in the fraction
of time devoted to human capital accumulation. For example, for δ = 0.08, the
proportion of time devoted to human capital accumulation increases from 24% when
T=30 to about 49% for T=60 years. For δ = 0.16, this proportion increases from
about 5% for a time horizon of 10 years to about 72% when T=50 years. This is
expected with individuals foreseeing that as they will live for longer periods, human
capital becomes more and more important in production with the diminishing stock
of the non-renewable resource. It leads us to the interesting result that individuals in
our model do have an incentive to stretch the life of the resource as far as they can by
extracting ever decreasing amounts of the remaining resource stock with simultane-
ously increasing the time devoted to human capital accumulation. This follows from
the production function as both the non-renewable resource and the time devoted
13
to work are necessary inputs of production. With the amount of the non-renewable
resource available each period falling with an increase in the time horizon, human
capital can be the only offsetting factor without any population growth in our model.
Once again, this would require an increasing proportion of non-leisure time devoted
to accumulating human capital and a decreasing fraction of non-leisure time devoted
to production.
On the other hand, given any length of the time horizon, the fraction of time
devoted to work decreases with an increase in the productivity parameter δ. For a
time horizon of as low as 10 years, individuals only devote about 5% of their time
to human capital accumulation when the productivity parameter is as high as 16%.
When T = 30, individuals devote 24% of their non-leisure time to human capital
accumulation when δ = 0.08 with the fraction rising to 62% for δ = 0.16. For T = 60
years, the fraction of time devoted to human capital accumulation increases from
31% for δ = 0.06 to 74% when δ = 0.16. This is intuitive as given any non-leisure
time the representative individual in our model has, it becomes more attractive to
spend a greater proportion of it on human capital accumulation and less on work as
the return to human capital accumulation increases. Figure 1.1 shows how u falls
with T given various values of δ. The lower curves correspond to higher values of the
productivity parameter for human capital accumulation. We see that for relatively
short time horizons, a small increase in T causes a big drop in the fraction of time
devoted to work whereas for longer time horizons, this responsiveness of u to changes
in T is not significant.
For the optimal rate of non-renewable resource extraction given by (1.12), we see
that it does not depend on the productivity parameter δ and only depends on the rate
of discount ρ and the time horizon T . For reasons given above, there is an indirect
effect of δ on r through increased human capital accumulation and reduced rate of
resource extraction. Now with ρ given, it is intuitive that a constant rate of resource
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Figure 1.1 Optimal constant u as function of T
extraction would fall if we are to conserve resources for a longer period (higher T ).
This implies that we would never run out of the stock of the exhaustible resource
but would have a smaller and smaller pool left from which to extract. Fig 1.2 shows
the optimal constant rate of resource extraction varying with the length of the time
horizon T . The resource-utilization ratio r would never touch the horizontal axis,
Figure 1.2 Optimal constant r as function of T
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but would be asymptotic to the discount rate ρ when T −→ ∞. The fact that the
rate of extraction of the non-renewable resource in the steady state tends to the rate
of discount as time goes to infinity will be clearly explained in the next section on
infinite horizon.
1.2.2 Infinite Horizon
To see if per capita consumption is at least positive over an infinite horizon, we
carry out a similar exercise as in the previous section. Discounting (1.9) over infinite
periods, we get
Z = lnA(u, r)
ρ
+ X(u, r)
ρ2
(1.18)
Maximizing (1.18) with respect to the control variables u and r, we get the optimal
constant solutions as
u∗ = αρ
δ(α + γ) (1.19)
and,
r∗ = ρ (1.20)
where “∗”denotes the optimal solution as before. In case of the infinite horizon too, we
see that individuals work at a constant proportion of the rate of resource extraction.
That is to say, (1.13) also holds in this case.
We perform similar comparative statics as shown in the last section. We then
have
∂u
∂δ
= − αρ
δ2(α + γ)
and,
∂u
∂γ
= − αρ
δ(α + γ)2 (1.21)
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Figure 1.3 Optimal constant u and r in
infinite horizon
It should be noted that in the infinite horizon case, the optimal constant solutions of
u and r do not depend on time. The optimal constant fraction of non-leisure time
devoted to work falls with the productivity parameter δ of human capital. As the
return to accumulate human capital rises, individuals devote more time to accumulate
human capital at the cost of lower work effort. All else equal, a rise in the external
effect of human capital γ has a similar effect as stated before. The solution for r∗ is
another form of the Hotelling Rule. In the long-run, the constant resource utilization
ratio equals the rate of discount ρ. This is because to maintain a positive consumption
level for an infinite period, the rate of resource extraction must fall at the same rate
at which future consumption is discounted (for infinite periods). Figure 1.3 shows
the optimal constant solutions of u and r as a function of δ for the infinite horizon
case.
To maintain a non-decreasing level of consumption for an infinite horizon, the
growth rate of output X should be positive. So substituting (1.19) and (1.20) in X
and writing X ≥ 0 we get
δ ≥ ρ(α + γ) (1.22)
The above condition can also be obtained by taking the limit as T −→ ∞ in (1.14).
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Condition (1.22) can be summarized in Fig 1.4. We use the parameter values used
Figure 1.4 Consumption profiles for different values of δ
in infinite horizon
previously with ρ = 0.05, α = 0.9 and γ = 0.4. According to (1.22), δ ≥ 0.038 for
consumption to be sustainable for infinite periods. This is in conformity with the
literature which has the value of δ to be around 0.04. For values of δ > 0.038, we
get ever increasing paths of per-capita consumption and when δ < 0.038, per-capita
consumption paths exhibit a downward profile.
1.3 Conclusion
Prior literature on exhaustible resources have shown the importance of physical cap-
ital accumulation in maintaining non-declining consumption levels for an infinite
horizon. Here we combine human capital with an exhaustible natural resource in
the production function and show that a constant rate of extraction of the resource
each period along with a constant rate of human capital accumulation can ensure
sustainable consumption paths for an extended finite and an infinite horizon. This
result depends on the magnitude of the return to accumulating human capital which
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should be such that the fraction of time devoted to acquiring human capital be at
least as much as the share of natural resources in production. Our result is parallel
to a prominent earlier work in this area by Stiglitz (1974).
For simplicity, this work looks at sustainable consumption levels only dealing with
a constant fraction of time devoted to accumulating human capital and a constant
rate of natural resource extraction. An avenue for future research could be to look at
substitution possibilities between exhaustible natural resources and renewable energy
sources such as wind or solar technologies. In this case, consumption levels can be
sustained by ensuring that the transition from non-renewable to renewable natural
resources be as smooth as possible. Non-renewable resources should be exhausted in
such a way that it takes a decreasing share of total output and the renewable resource
takes a corresponding increasing share near the time of depletion of the exhaustible
resource. Investment in human capital or R&D to make alternative technologies
cheaper would vary with time and depend on the remaining stock of the exhaustible
natural resource.
Further extensions can be to include pollution from exhaustible natural resources
in the model. In the event of high pollution costs from increasing fossil fuel use, it
may be optimal for a society to make a complete switch to cleaner alternative energy
sources even leaving some stock of the fossil fuel unused. Research can be undertaken
on the time paths of investments in renewable alternative energy sources such that
it becomes significantly cheaper for a society to use these technologies when moving
away from exhaustible natural resources.
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Chapter 2
Polluting Resources and Green Technologies
Abstract
Previous studies on backstop technologies for exhaustible resources
have focused on the impact of arrival uncertainty of a backstop on the
rate of depletion of the exhaustible resource. Here, we consider a back-
stop available in nearly unlimited supply (for ex. wind or solar) but with
significantly higher costs relative to a perfect substitute non-renewable
resource. Though private investments in knowledge by firms help reduce
the operating costs of the backstop, they do not fully realize the exter-
nal benefits of their own investment decisions. We show that there is an
underinvestment problem in backstop technologies and this externality
leads to under-extraction of the exhaustible resource. The underinvest-
ment problem persists when flow pollution is introduced to the model.
Results do not change for the equilibrium solution but we observe signifi-
cant differences in the optimal solution. For a low range of pollution cost
values relative to the cost of the backstop technology, the time of exhaus-
tion of the resource increases with a rise in the cost of pollution. This
implies a slower rate of extraction with lesser investments in each period.
For higher pollution cost values, the planner invests in the backstop at
a much faster rate but for a shorter period and finds it optimal to leave
some stock in the ground when switching completely to the backstop. In
the extreme case, the resource stock is left totally unused as the backstop
is adopted from the very beginning.
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2.1 Introduction
It is well documented that exhaustible resources has its own problems. Apart from
its very nature of being in limited supply, pollution and global warming are other
serious issues associated with the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and gasoline.
The problem of how to deal with the exhaustible nature of natural resources
was earlier analyzed by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) among others.
They conclude that continual physical capital accumulation from an early period
may help in maintaining consumption levels as long as the exhaustible resource is
not completely depleted. Later studies have dealt with effects of uncertainty in the
arrival of an alternative technology on rates of depletion of the exhaustible resource.
Kamien and Schwartz (1978) and Hung and Quyen (1993) are relevant examples.
As is commonly known in the literature, we would refer to these alternative sources
of energy as backstop technologies. Backstop technologies such as wind or solar en-
ergy can act as perfect substitutes in the production process and are non-polluting
in nature. The reason that we do not observe a wider use of these technologies is
because of their costs relative to fossil fuels such as coal and gasoline. As an ex-
ample, with the help of data available from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA), the U.S. average levelized costs for a megawatt hour from conventional coal
and solar power (from photo-voltaic cells) are $94.8 and $210.7 respectively. With
significant per-unit cost differences between the exhaustible resource and the back-
stop, public investments and subsidies to research in developing cheaper alternative
technologies may help in reducing these gaps. Tsur and Zemel (2005), in a model
with an exhaustible resource and a perfect-substitute backstop technology, include
investments in knowledge (ex.photo-voltaic electricity) which reduces the per-unit
cost of the backstop. They analyze the optimal paths of investment in knowledge
and physical capital accumulation in the context of an individual firm. However, it
may be interesting to look at the problem of underinvestment in knowledge when
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knowledge is an impure public good. In a situation when most investments in al-
ternative technologies around the world are made by governments, the question is
whether individual firms have enough incentives to invest more in these technologies.
Aronsson (2001) analyzes how externalities in investments in the backstop and pol-
lution arising from use of the exhaustible resource can be corrected by mechanisms
such as taxes and subsidies to research and development. Goeschl and Perino (2007)
study optimal investment paths in R&D in the case of uncertainty where none of the
backstops invented solves the pollution problem once and for all. Examples can be
radioactive wastes associated with use of nuclear energy which is a substitute to fossil
fuels.
We extend the paper introducing flow pollution associated with exhaustible re-
source use. Graff Zivin and Neidell (2011) have analyzed the impact of ozone pollution
on worker productivity: pollution affects productivity on the intensive margin even
in cases where labor supply is unaffected. Ozone is not directly emitted, but forms
from the complex interactions between nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic
chemicals (VOCs), both of which are directly emitted in the presence of heat and
sunlight. Currie and Schmieder (2008) find significant negative effects of toxic re-
leases on birth outcomes. Classifying the toxics from EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) into developmental toxicants and those which are not known to have develop-
mental effects, the authors find much larger estimated effects for the developmental
releases. In particular, the effects are pronounced for gestation and birth weight.
Some developmental chemicals are also shown to increase the probability of infant
death.
We see two main contributions of this study. Firstly, we provide a simple model of
an exhaustible resource and a perfect substitute backstop technology that addresses
public policy questions of underinvestment by firms in alternative technologies and
global pollution problems arising from individual resource use. To our knowledge,
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we are the first to look at these two possible sources of externality simultaneously in
the context of a firm. We find that optimal policy may involve switching sooner to
the backstop technology as compared to the equilibrium solution, and in cases with
significantly high pollution costs, leaving some resource in the ground.
We do not include extraction costs of the resource and any uncertainty in the
arrival of a perfect substitute backstop technology to keep the model tractable. Our
second contribution lies in finding optimal numerical solutions of the variables of the
system such as the time of switch to the backstop and the percent of resource used at
the time of switch given the parameters of the model. We resort to complex numerical
methods to do so.
The following sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the main model of the paper which is used for both cases when pollution is and is not
included to the model. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the competitive equilibrium solution
and the social planner solution in detail. In Section 5, we solve the model including
flow pollution. We provide solutions for both the competitive equilibrium and the
social planner in this section. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of our
main findings and possible extensions for future research.
2.2 Model
There is a single “composite commodity”y produced in the whole economy. The
composite commodity is used for both consumption and investment and we assume
away savings in the model. Production of the composite commodity requires energy
and labor. Energy, in turn, requires a non-renewable resource and a perfect substitute
backstop technology. This backstop is assumed to be in practically unlimited supply.
Producing energy using backstop technologies is initially more expensive than
using exhaustible resources to produce energy. Investments in knowledge accumula-
tion, technical know-how regarding backstop technologies, can however reduce their
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use costs significantly. Moreover, investments in education or accumulation of human
capital might bring about inventions of newer, cheaper alternative technologies.
We assume an economy having a continuum of identical firms. Each firm is owned
by an infinitely-lived household. The number of individuals belonging to a representa-
tive household is given by l. For simplicity, we abstract from any population growth.
The production function facing a representative household producing y is given by
y = e1−αlα (2.1)
where 0 < α < 1 and 0 < (1 − α) < 1 denote the respective shares of energy and
labor.
All firms are assumed price takers and entry and exit is not permitted in the
model. The price of y is assumed to be constant at unity. Total energy production is
denoted by e and is given by
e = b+ r (2.2)
where b ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0 represent backstop and exhaustible resource use by a repre-
sentative firm. As is evident from the above expression, the backstop and resource
are perfect substitutes in the production of total energy e. We would use the terms
“exhaustible resource ”and “resource ”interchangably.
The representative household maximizes the Present Discounted Value (PDV) of
net profits over infinite periods. Net profits are given by total production net of input
costs and investments in knowledge regarding the backstop. There are no extraction
costs for the resource and total costs only include the cost of using the backstop.
The cost of the backstop is expressed in terms of the composite commodity y. We
follow the framework of Tsur and Zemel (2005) and assume investments in the stock
of knowledge from current period production will reduce future costs of using the
backstop. The average cost of the backstop is denoted as
M(n) = q + a
N1−βnβ
(2.3)
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where n represents the stock of knowledge for a representative firm. Here N denotes
the average stock of knowledge for the whole economy. q > 0 and a > 0 are parameters
of the model.
The knowledge accumulation function is given by
n˙ =
√
i (2.4)
where n0 > 0 denotes the given initial stock of knowledge. Here i ≥ 0 denotes
investment for a representative firm. The cost of investment is also given in terms of
the composite commodity y.
In the equilibrium solution, firms’ assume that their individual investment deci-
sions can only affect their private stock of knowledge and do not have an appreciable
impact on N . So they treat the economy-wide average stock of knowledge as given.
This public good problem gives rise to underinvestment in knowledge for the backstop
technology. The degree to which knowledge is public is governed by the parameter
0 ≤ β ≤ 1. As β approaches unity, the equilibrium solution coincides with the
optimal solution.
Each household has an identical initial endowment of the stock of the exhaustible
resource and knowledge (s0 and n0). The representative household draws down the
initial resource stock according to ∫ ∞
0
rdt ≤ s0 (2.5)
where s0 > 0 denotes the initial stock of the exhaustible resource.
The net profits for the jth representative household (firm) in any period t is given
by
e1−αt l
α
t −
(
q + a
N1−βntβ
)
bt − it
Since population is assumed constant, we normalize the labor input for each firm
to be equal to 1. Maximization of the PDV of net profits over infinite periods for
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firm j leads to the following problem after substituting (2.2) in (2.1) and deducting
cost of the backstop (2.3) and investment (we omit the time subscripts for notational
convenience)
max
∫ ∞
t=0
(
(b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
N1−βnβ
)
b− i
)
e−ρtdt (2.6)
s.t. (2.4) and,
s˙ = −r (2.7)
N =
∫ 1
0
njdj (2.8)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate. The initial stocks of the resource s0 and that of
knowledge n0 are given. The optimal path of the problem is given by b, r, i ≥ 0.
0 < α < 1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, q > 0 and a > 0 are the parameters of the system.
The investment problem of the representative household (firm) is such that only
part of the average cost of backstop use can be reduced by investing in knowledge.(
a
N1−βnjβ
)
represents the portion of the average cost of backstop which falls with
knowledge accumulation whereas q is the portion that is fixed. As each firm is en-
dowed with identical initial stocks of the exhaustible resource and knowledge, even
introducing markets wouldn’t affect the model as individual firms’ would not have
any incentives for trade. Equation (2.5) is important in that it tells us that the sum
of resource flows over infinite periods cannot exceed the given initial stock of the
exhaustible resource. The knowledge accumulation function represented by equation
(2.4) is concave implying that it pays to invest little amounts every period rather
than investing a lot in any one period.
The above problem at the firm level leads to a divergence between the social
planner (S.P.) and the competitive equilibrium (C.E.) solutions. Individual firms,
thinking alike that their own investment decisions only have a negligible impact on
the average stock of knowledge for the whole economy N , underinvest in knowledge
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at the aggregate level. The social planner fully internalizes the positive externality
of investments in knowledge by a representative firm. Hence, we see a larger effect
in reducing the average cost of the backstop in the S.P. solution than in the C.E.
solution. The degree of external vs. private benefit of knowledge accumulation is
captured by the parameter β. When β = 0, all benefits are fully external as individual
firms cannot reduce the average cost of the backstop in any way through their own
investment decisions. At the other extreme when β = 1, the average cost of the
backstop only depends on the individual level of knowledge for the representative
firm. In this case, the full extent of externality is internalized and the C.E. and
S.P. solutions coincide. Direct subsidies to R&D or intellectual property rules can
influence β which can bring the equilibrium solution closer to the optimal one.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium Solution
The current-valued Hamiltonian of the above problem for the jth representative firm
can be written as
H = (b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
N1−βnβ
)
b− i+ λ1
√
i− λ2r + θ1b+ θ2r + θ3i
s and n are the states of the system. b, r and i are the control variables. We denote
the shadow prices by λi’s and the Lagrange multipliers associated with the controls
by respective θi’s. λi, θi ≥ 0.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are
∂H
∂b
= (1− α)(b+ r)−α −
(
q + a
N1−βnβ
)
+ θ1 = 0, θ1b = 0 (2.9)
∂H
∂r
= (1− α)(b+ r)−α − λ2 + θ2 = 0, θ2r = 0 (2.10)
∂H
∂i
= −1 + λ1
2
√
i
+ θ3 = 0, θ3i = 0 (2.11)
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λ˙1 = ρλ1 − ∂H
∂n
= ρλ1 − aβ
N1−βnβ+1
b (2.12)
λ˙2 = ρλ2 − ∂H
∂s
= ρλ2 (2.13)
the transversality conditions are given by
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ1(t)n(t) = 0 (2.14)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ2(t)s(t) = 0 (2.15)
As all firms are identical, the average stock of knowledge for the whole economy N
equals the individual stock of knowledge n for a representative firm. Imposing the
aggregate consistency condition N = n in the above first-order conditions, we can
simplify (2.9) and (2.12) as
(1− α)(b+ r)−α −
(
q + a
n
)
+ θ1 = 0, θ1b = 0 (2.16)
λ˙1 = ρλ1 − ∂H
∂n
= ρλ1 − aβ
n2
b (2.17)
the other conditions given by (2.10), (2.11), (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) remain as before.
The above necessary conditions imply that we can either have an interior or corner
solution for the three control variables b, r and i. However, from (2.11) we see that
i = 0 implies θ3 = 1 − ∞ which is impossible. When i = 0, the marginal cost of
investment in knowledge is 1 and the marginal benefit is infinitely large. So investment
i would always be positive in the model and from (2.11), we get θ3 = 0. Also note
that λ2 always rises at the constant rate of ρ by (2.13). This is the Hotelling Rule.
We now look into separate cases of interior and corner solutions for the other two
control variables b and r.
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2.3.1 Three Cases, Two Phases
Case I: We can first consider the interior case of b > 0 and r > 0. This implies that
θ1 = θ2 = 0. Then the first-order conditions reduce to the following
(1− α)(b+ r)−α = q + a
n
(2.18)
and,
(1− α)(b+ r)−α = λ2 (2.19)
From (2.4) and (2.11) and setting θ3 = 0, we get
n˙ =
√
i = λ12 (2.20)
The above necessary conditions for optimality for the exhaustible resource and the
backstop technology equate their marginal benefits to their marginal costs. Since n
and λ2 are both rising, and q and a are constant, it is not possible for both (2.18) and
(2.19) to be satisfied simultaneously. The equations imply an indeterminate division
of b and r; so we can only have their simultaneous use at one instant in time when
the marginal cost of the backstop equals the shadow cost of the resource.
Total optimal energy use e∗ in the above case of an interior solution in both the
resource and the backstop is given by
e∗ =
(
1− α
q + a
n
) 1
α
=
(1− α
λ2
) 1
α
(2.21)
Case II: We next consider one of the corner cases of r > 0 and b = 0. This implies
θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0. Then the first-order conditions reduce to
(1− α)r−α = q + a
n
− θ1 (2.22)
and,
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(1− α)r−α = λ2 (2.23)
Equation (2.23) reveals that the optimal value of r is
e∗ = r∗ =
(1− α
λ2
) 1
α
(2.24)
As 0 < α < 1 is a parameter of the model, the above necessary conditions imply falling
resource extraction over time at a with the rise in λ2. Equation (2.22) determines the
value of θ1 =
(
q + a
n
)
− λ2 which must be falling over time.
Substituting b = 0 in (2.17) we get
λ˙1 = ρλ1 (2.25)
So both the co-states λ1 and λ2 grow at the constant rate ρ in this case. As the
backstop is not used, this makes sense as one unit of knowledge accumulated today
adds up to next period’s knowledge stock discounted at the rate ρ. The total optimal
energy use is given by equation (2.24).
Case III: We finally consider the corner case of b > 0 and r = 0. This implies
θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0. As before, i > 0 here. Then the first-order conditions reduce to
(1− α)b−α = q + a
n
(2.26)
and,
(1− α)b−α = λ2 − θ2 (2.27)
Equation (2.26) reveals that the optimal value of b is
e∗ = b∗ =
(
1− α
q + a
n
) 1
α
(2.28)
Given the fact that 0 < α < 1 is a parameter of the model, the optimal backstop use
is rising over time with growing knowledge accumulation. Equation (2.27) gives the
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optimal value of θ2 = λ2 −
(
q + a
n
)
which is also rising over time. Total energy use
follows the path of backstop use given by (2.28) and grows without bound. In reality
however, there are geophysical limits or a certain carrying capacity of the earth which
puts a check on this rising energy use.
From (2.21), (2.24) and (2.28), we can conclude that total energy is produced
using either the resource or the backstop or with an indeterminate division between
the two at one point in time. There is no alternative use of the resource. As the
non-renewable resource and the backstop are perfect substitutes, it is only rational
for individual households (firms) to use one or the other at any given time period.
What is used first depends on the relative costs of the two inputs for production of
total energy e. The resource is free to extract but incurs a shadow cost of λ2. In
contrast, the marginal cost of the backstop is always positive.
However, leaving any stock of resource in the ground is not optimal; thus the
resource would be exhausted at first before switching over completely to the backstop.
This time of switch would not only correspond to the date of exhaustion of the non-
renewable resource but would occur when the marginal costs of b and r become equal.
The point of switchover corresponds to Case I when there is an indeterminate division
between the two sources of energy use. Denoting this date of exhaustion of the given
initial resource stock s0 as T , we can summarize the results of the above three cases
as
1. e∗ = r∗ until some finite time T when θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0
2. e∗=either b∗ or r∗ or both at T when θ1 = θ2 = 0
3. e∗ = b∗ after T when θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0
So for all practical purposes, we can capture the above three cases in two phases,
Phase 1 (r > 0, b = 0) and Phase 2 (r = 0, b > 0). We would assume that the
exhaustible resource is used until T and the backstop is used from the very next
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instant. That is to say, optimum resource use at T would equal optimum backstop
use from (2.28).
Figure 2.1 shows the optimal energy profile combining the above three cases. The
Figure 2.1 Energy Profile for C.E.
optimal energy profile in the competitive equilibrium case is V-shaped and continuous
but with a kink at the time of switchover from the resource to the backstop. To see
if the transversality condition (2.15) is satisfied for the optimal energy profile, we can
modify it for a finite horizon case as
e−ρTλ2(T )s(T ) = 0 (2.29)
where T denotes the date of exhaustion of the resource stock. The condition is
satisfied as s(T ) = 0.
2.3.2 Finding the Switching Time
2.3.2.1 Exhaustion Condition
We can find the time T at which the economy switches from the first phase (r >
0, b = 0) to the second (r = 0, b > 0) by combining the first-order-conditions and
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constraints. We cannot find this in closed form, however, so we must use numerical
methods to do so.
Since the resource is fully exhausted at the time of switch, using (2.5) we can
write
∫ T
0
r(t)dt = s0 (2.30)
using (2.24), the above condition implies∫ T
0
(
1− α
λ2(0)eρt
) 1
α
dt = s0 (2.31)
Call rT the extraction rate at the time of switch. Assuming energy use is continuous,
we can use (2.28) to write rT = bT : the rate of resource extraction is the same as the
rate of backstop production at the time of the switch. Suppose at this point we know
rT . We also know the initial resource stock s0. Equations (2.24), (2.28), and (2.31)
allow us to find T and r(0) as functions of rT and s0. They are given by
T =
[
ln
(
1 + ρ
rTα
s0
)]
α
ρ
(2.32)
r(0) = rT +
ρ
α
s0 (2.33)
Call (2.32) as
T = m(rT ) (2.34)
From (2.28), we can find rT as a function of the stock of knowledge at the time
of the switchover as
rT = bT =
 1− α
q + a
nT
 1α ≡ h(nT ) (2.35)
Therefore, if we knew nT we would know rT , and given our data on s0, we could find
T and r(0). Using (2.34) and (2.35), the function that relates T to nT can be written
as
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T = m[h(nT )] = w(nT ) (2.36)
We know that w′(nT ) < 0. This would be important in what follows.
2.3.2.2 Knowledge Condition
We now turn our attention to the investment in knowledge sector. To find the key
value nT we must work our way backwards. That is, we begin in Phase 2, when the
resource has been depleted, and we are using only the backstop. Combine (2.17) and
(2.28) to get
λ˙1 = ρλ1 − aβ
n2
(
1− α
q + a
n
) 1
α
(2.37)
Equation (2.37) together with equation (2.20) give the relevant equations for con-
structing a phase diagram in the (n, λ1) space after the switch to the backstop. The
downward sloping curve corresponds to the λ˙1 = 0 locus and the n˙ = 0 locus coin-
cides with the horizontal axis. Figure 2.2 shows the phase plane after the switch to
the backstop for the equilibrium solution. In Figure 2.2 we see paths along which
Figure 2.2 Phase Plane when r = 0, b > 0 for C.E.
λ1 becomes negative or infinitely large when n → ∞. We can single out one path
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(shaded green) which asymptotes to the horizontal axis in the limit. This stable
path that satisfies transversality can be found by numerical methods. It is sometimes
called the “policy function.” Along the policy function, λ1 tends to zero and the
knowledge stock converges to a very large number: the product λ1n converges to zero
(a constant) when t→∞. We represent the policy function by
λ1 = p(n) (2.38)
Taking the ratio of λ˙1
n˙
from (2.20) and (2.37), we get the slope of the policy function
in (n, λ1) space after the switch to the backstop.
We now try to find the policy function for λ1 in Phase 1 when only the exhaustible
resource is used. From (2.25), we see that λ1 grows at the constant rate ρ when b = 0.
As before, we can get the slope of the policy function using the ratio λ˙1
n˙
from (2.20)
and (2.25). We notice λ1 would be a linear function of n in this phase. The path of
λ1 in Phase 1 can be given by
λ1(t) = λ1(0)eρt (2.39)
for any t given some initial λ1(0). Combining the above equation with (2.20), we can
write the evolution of n(t) in Phase 1 as
n(t) = λ1(0)2ρ
(
eρt − 1
)
+ n0 (2.40)
Eliminating time from equation(2.40), we get
λ1 = λ1(0) + 2ρ (n− n0) (2.41)
where n0 ≡ n(0) denotes the initial given stock of knowledge. Therefore, in this
phase, the policy function has the closed form (2.41). It slopes upward and must
intersect p(n) at a finite value of n. This intersection point is the switchover point
and must correspond to nT described above.
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So for any given n0, an optimal choice of λ1(0), Figure 2.3 plots the policy func-
tion in (n, λ1) space. In Figure 2.3, the path of λ1 is continuous but has a kink
Figure 2.3 λ1(n): policy function for C.E.
corresponding to nT and the shadow price of the stock of knowledge at the time of
switch to the backstop technology. We denote these points by (nˆ, λˆ1).
Note that we can express nT as a function of the initial shadow price of knowledge,
x ≡ λ1(0). We use numerical methods to find this functional form. Setting different
values of x, we equate (2.38) and (2.41) and solve for nT as a function of x. We call
this function
nT = f(x) (2.42)
Since Figure 2.3 implies that a higher initial λ1(0) would lead to lower values of nT ,
we can write f ′(x) < 0. The f(x) is the key to finding the optimal switchover time
T . We plot the function f(x) in Figure 2.4.
Now (2.40) can be solved for T to get
T = 1
ρ
ln
[(
f(x)− n0
x
)
2ρ+ 1
]
(2.43)
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Figure 2.4 nT as function of λ1(0) in C.E. : here uu
denotes λ1(0) and nhat denotes nT
Call (2.43) T = z(x) with z′(x) < 0. We can substitute (2.42) in (2.36) to get T as an
upward sloping function of x. Call the resulting equation T = g(x), g′(x) > 0. Figure
2.5 plots the functions z(x) and g(x). We use numerical methods to find x∗ and T ∗.
Figure 2.5 Profiles of T as function of λ1(0) in C.E. :
uu denotes λ1(0)
Once found, we use (2.42) to get n∗T . This allows us to find r∗T ≡ b∗T from equation
(2.35) and then r∗(0) from (2.33) going backwards. The optimal initial shadow price
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of the resource stock, λ∗2(0), can be found by substituting r∗(0) in (2.24). Since
λ1(0) grows at the discount rate until the time of switch, x∗T ≡ λ∗1(T ) can also be
obtained. Finally, using (2.20), we get numerical solutions for the optimal investments
in knowledge at time zero and at T from x∗ and x∗T .
2.3.3 Investment and Profits
Investment is always positive in the model. The optimal path of investment closely
follows that of λ1 from (2.20). Figure 2.6 shows the optimal path of investment as a
function of the knowledge stock. As expected, the above figure has a similar shape
Figure 2.6 Investment profile for C.E.
to figure 2.3. Investment in knowledge grows at a constant rate until the switchover
point and then starts falling as the stock of knowledge accumulates and gets larger
and larger. Optimal investment profiles over time would also first rise and then fall
after the switch to the backstop technology as in figure 2.6.
Now we consider the situation of profits when we do not have any extraction cost
of the resource and the only cost associated with resource extraction is its shadow
price. In a competitive equilibrium solution with extraction costs, the market price of
a unit of the resource will be the sum of its extraction cost and shadow price. Here,
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in the absence of any costs of extraction, the market price of a unit of the resource
will only equal its shadow price.
This is because of the following reason. Although we have a continuum of identical
firms in the economy and there is no trading of the resource stock between firms, firms
buying one unit of the resource will only pay a price less than or equal to the marginal
benefit it gets from the resource and firms offering to sell a unit of the resource will
only accept prices greater than or equal to its marginal cost. Since the marginal
benefit of using one more unit of the resource is its shadow price which leaves one less
unit on the ground, the marginal cost incurred due to this is also its shadow price.
Thus if the possibility of trading is allowed, firms’ would buy and sell the resource
only at the shadow price of λ2.
Net profits for a representative household is given by total production net of the
cost of the backstop and investments in knowledge. Each household is assumed to
consume its entire profits. Equilibrium profits or consumption over time is shown in
figure 2.7. Firm profits fall in the phase of only resource use due to falling extraction
Figure 2.7 Equilibrium net profits
of the exhaustible resource stock combined with increasing investments in knowledge.
The jump in the profits profile occurs as backstop costs kick in at the time of switch.
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The magnitude of this jump equals the cost of the backstop M(n) at T . With
knowledge accumulating at a decreasing rate after the switch to the backstop in
combination with growing backstop use, profits rise slowly in this phase.
2.4 Social Planner Solution
The social planner fully internalizes the external benefits of investments in knowledge
which reduces the average cost of the backstop. Compared to the C.E. solution, it
is as if β = 1 for the S.P. solution. We can thus impose the aggregate consistency
condition N = n for the jth representative firm before maximization of its net profits.
Re-writing the equation for the average cost of the backstop in the S.P. case we get
M(n) = q + a
n
(2.44)
The maximization problem for the planner solution can then be written as
max
∫ ∞
t=0
(
(b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
n
)
b− i
)
e−ρtdt (2.45)
s.t. (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8). We write the subsequent Hamiltonian as
H = (b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
n
)
b− i+ λ1
√
i− λ2r + θ1b+ θ2r + θ3i
As before, s and n are the states of the system and b, r and i are the controls. We
denote the shadow prices by λi’s and the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
controls by respective θi’s. λi, θi ≥ 0.
Taking the first-order conditions, we get (2.16), (2.10), (2.11), (2.13), (2.14) and
(2.15) as before. The necessary condition for optimality with regard to λ1 now changes
to
λ˙1 = ρλ1 − a
n2
b (2.46)
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Since firms do not fully internalize the externality in the equilibrium solution, the
externality parameter β shows up in the first-order condition for λ1 even after im-
posing the aggregate consistency condition. However, since the first-order conditions
across the equilibrium and planner solutions coincide for the control variables b, r
and i, their paths would be identical. Investment in knowledge is always positive
as in the equilibrium solution and its time path would be given by (2.20) as before.
The optimum energy profile would also look V-shaped as in the equilibrium solution:
the planner would only use the resource in the first phase followed by a phase of
only backstop use. The non-renewable resource would also be completely exhausted
at the time of switch to the backstop. Interestingly, although optimal energy use
would be the same across the two solutions, there might be level differences at each
point in time. We would once again consider the modified transversality condition in
equation(2.29) which would be satisfied as the resource is fully exhausted at the time
of switch (we denote the date of exhaustion by T as in the equilibrium solution).
Figure 2.8 shows the energy profiles for the S.P. and C.E. solutions in one graph.
The profiles of resource and backstop use look exactly the same for the equilibrium
Figure 2.8 Energy Profiles for S.P. and C.E.
and planner solutions. The points of kink, which show the time at which the non-
renewable resource is exhausted and the switch to the backstop is made, is affected by
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the level differences across the two solutions. The planner begins with higher extrac-
tion from the initial period and sooner exhausts the given resource stock. Since the
planner extracts more of the resource every period relative to a firm in equilibrium,
investment (which is taken out of production of the composite commodity y) would
also be higher until the time of switch. This would imply a higher knowledge stock at
T for the optimum solution compared to the equilibrium one. Some of the differences
between the C.E. and S.P. solutions are shown in a following section.
2.4.1 Finding the Switching Time
We find the switching time for the planner solution using numerical methods. Given
the first-order conditions for the planner solution, T and r(0) can be expressed as
functions of rT and s0 by (2.32) and (2.33) as before. In addition, rT can be related
to nT using equation (2.35). To find the key value of nT in the S.P. solution, we begin
in Phase 2 (r = 0, b > 0). We find the equation for λ˙1 using (2.28) and (2.46) to get
λ˙1 = ρλ1 − a
n2
(
1− α
q + a
n
) 1
α
(2.47)
As in the C.E. solution, we proceed by constructing a phase diagram in the (n, λ1)
space using (2.47) and (2.20). Figure 2.9 shows the phase diagram. We can sin-
gle out the policy function for λ1 (shaded green) from figure 2.9 which satisfies the
transversality condition. This policy function is found by using numerical methods.
The policy function for the planner solution in Phase 2 is written as
λ1 = l(n) (2.48)
To find the policy function for Phase 1 (r > 0, b = 0), we note that λ1 grows at the
rate of discount from equation (2.25). Since the motion equation for n is given by
(2.20) as before, the policy function for the planner solution would have the same
form as in the equilibrium solution for the first phase. It would be given by the
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Figure 2.9 Phase Plane when r = 0, b > 0 for S.P.
closed form (2.41) (however, optimal λ1(0) would be different for the two solutions).
This policy function slopes upward and must intersect l(n) at the knowledge level
corresponding to the switchover point, or nT . The slope of the policy function can
be found by taking the ratio of λ˙1
n˙
for both Phase 1 and Phase 2. For any given n0,
an optimal choice of λ1(0), we show the full policy function for the social planner in
figure 2.10. In figure 2.10 the optimal path of λ1 (as a function of n) is continuous
Figure 2.10 λ1(n): policy function for S.P.
43
but has a kink corresponding to the knowledge level and its shadow price at the time
of switch. These are denoted (nˆ, λˆ1) as in the equilibrium solution.
We find the important value of nT using techniques adopted when solving the
competitive equilibrium. Equating (2.41) and (2.48) and using numerical methods,
we can arrive at the key relation (2.42). Proceeding as before, we get the solution
for the optimal time of switchover T ∗ and the initial shadow price of knowledge
x∗ ≡ λ∗1(0) from (2.36) and (2.43) after substituting (2.42). This allows us to find n∗T
for the planner solution. In turn, we can find optimal values of the initial resource use,
the initial shadow price of the resource stock λ∗2(0), and values of optimal investments
in knowledge at time zero and at the time of switch to the backstop.
2.4.2 Investment and Profits
We now turn to the investment profile for the S.P. solution. As before, the optimal
path of investment in knowledge i closely follows that of λ1 from (2.20). For a given
initial stock of knowledge n0, figure 2.11 shows the optimum investment profiles for
the C.E. and S.P. solutions. Both the above functions have a kink at respective
Figure 2.11 Investment profiles for S.P. and C.E.
(nˆ, iˆ)’s. As in the equilibrium solution, investment in knowledge first rises and then
falls for the planner solution. Investment in knowledge starts to fall in Phase 2 as the
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knowledge stock gets larger. This figure is one of the central ones of the paper so far. It
shows precisely the underinvestment problem in the equilibrium solution compared to
the optimal one. The planner invests more in knowledge compared to the equilibrium
solution from the initial period and ends up with a higher accumulated knowledge
stock at the time of switch (the dashed lines represent the respective knowledge stock
at the time of switch nT and not the time of switch T ). The above figure captures
the significant level differences between the two solutions although the shapes of the
policy functions are very similar.
Figure 2.12 shows the relevant graph for investment profiles over time for the
planner and equilibrium solutions. Investment is higher in the planner solution than
Figure 2.12 Time paths of investment for S.P.
and C.E.
in the equilibrium solution in every time period. The points of kink show that switch
to the backstop occurs sooner in the optimal solution compared to the time of switch
by a firm in the competitive equilibrium.
Finally we can compare net profits across the equilibrium and planner solutions.
Figure 2.13 shows the two curves together in one graph. Comparing the profit profiles
for the equilibrium and the planner solutions, we find interesting results. The planner
extracts more out of the resource stock every period relative to the competitive equi-
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Figure 2.13 Net profits for S.P. and C.E.
librium until the time of switch to the backstop. So firm profits would be higher for
the planner solution for the first few time periods. Over time, as the rate of resource
use falls and investments in knowledge rise, profits for the optimum solution would
fall below those for the equilibrium solution briefly. Comparing net profits at the
respective times of switch to the backstop for the planner and equilibrium solutions,
we see that the former is greater: this is because both n∗T and r∗T ≡ b∗T are higher for
the planner solution. The jump in profits for both solutions at the switchover point
equals the average cost of the backstop given by (2.3). The interesting feature is that
profits remain higher for the planner solution compared to the equilibrium one after
the switchover time T . Although the planner has a higher backstop use and invests
more in knowledge accumulation relative to a firm in equilibrium, the total value
of production dominates these previous effects for the social planner. Thus optimal
profits are higher than the equilibrium one after the time of switch.
2.4.3 Comparison of the C.E. and S.P. Solutions
We use numerical methods to get the time of switchover, the key values of the controls,
and those of the shadow prices for both the equilibrium and planner solutions. Using
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Table 2.1 Comparison of C.E. and
S.P. solutions
Values C.E. S.P.
λ∗1(0) 0.087 0.189
λˆ1 = λ∗1(T ) 0.177 0.34
nˆ = n∗T 2.129 2.884
T ∗ 17.803 14.655
b∗T ≡ r∗T 0.031 0.043
r∗(0) 0.091 0.103
i∗(0) 0.002 0.009
λ∗2(0) 1.642 1.521
PDV of net profits 7.865 8.035
standard values in the literature of α = 0.667 and ρ = 0.04, we fix the other parameter
values to be β = 0.33, q = 1, a = 5, s0 = 1 and n0 = 1. We do not have any
intuition on the value of the externality parameter β. As it is difficult to measure
externality in a typical public goods problem, we assume that only 1/3 of the benefits
of knowledge accumulation accrue to a specific firm. We consider a representative
backstop technology in our model. Avoiding aggregation issues when there are many
alternative technologies to non-renewable resources such as coal and oil in reality, we
arbitrarily fix the cost parameters so that the backstop is relatively expensive to the
resource to start with. In addition, it seems plausible that knowledge accumulation
could reduce a majority of this cost. The initial stocks of the non-renewable resource
and knowledge are random numbers as varying these initial values would only add
scale effects to the results.
We summarize the results in table 2.1. Initial investment is significantly lower
in the equilibrium solution compared to the planner solution. This leads to lower
accumulated knowledge levels for the equilibrium solution compared to the optimal
one at the time of switch to the backstop: the accumulated knowledge stock is 2.88
for the optimal solution and 2.13 for the equilibrium solution. The problem of under-
investment in knowledge arises because of an inefficiently slower resource extraction
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in the equilibrium solution: the resource is exhausted fully in 17.8 years whereas it
takes 14.66 years for the planner to run out of the resource and switch completely
to the backstop. The above two facts can be explained by a higher initial shadow
price of knowledge and a lower initial shadow price of the resource stock for the social
planner. As the planner extracts more out of the initial resource stock, the value of
the backstop at the time of switch is higher for the planner at 0.04 compared to 0.03
for the equilibrium solution. Finally, the value of the “PDV of net profits” gives the
value of the total plan for the two solutions: the planner does better overall compared
to the individual firm in equilibrium.
2.5 Introducing flow pollution to the model
We introduce flow pollution to the above model. The assumption that the resource
and backstop are perfect substitutes is still maintained. Our objective is to explore
the differences in results between the planner and equilibrium solutions.
Flow pollution has been proven to have adverse health effects as in studies by
Currie and Schmieder (2008) and Graff Zivin and Neidell (2011). In our model,
pollution at any instant of time is caused by the aggregate use of the exhaustible
resource in production by all firms. Pollution enters as a cost in the profits of the
representative firm although each firm ignores the effect of its action on total pollution
in any given time period. For simplicity, we assume the average cost of pollution to
be constant.
2.5.1 Model
The structure of the model is identical to the previous one when there was no pol-
lution. There is a continuum of identical firms in the economy and each household
is assumed to own one firm. A firm produces a composite commodity using energy.
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Energy, in turn is produced from an exhaustible resource and a perfect substitute
backstop. As before, the average cost of the backstop can be reduced through invest-
ments in the stock of knowledge. The only difference from the previous model is that
pollution results from resource extraction by all firms in the economy. Pollution due
to aggregate resource use adversely affects net profits for a representative household.
Since firms’ now face backstop costs and additional costs of pollution, net profits
for a representative firm j in each period is given by
(b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
N1−βnβ
)
b− i− dR (2.49)
where
R =
∫ 1
0
rjdj (2.50)
R represents aggregate resource use for the model. An optimizing firm in equilibrium
does not take into account the fact that its own resource use adds up to the pollution
stock accumulated in any single period. However, all firms bear a cost for this total
stock of pollution: this can be thought of as an instantaneous damage cost or a
negative effect on firm productivity. The parameter d > 0 measures the pollution
cost per unit for a representative firm. Maximization of the PDV of net profits over
infinite periods for firm j now leads to the following problem
max
∫ ∞
t=0
(
(b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
N1−βnβ
)
b− i− dR
)
e−ρtdt (2.51)
s.t. (2.4), (2.5), (2.8) and (2.50). n0 and s0 are given. The other parameters remain
the same as before.
We analyze the competitive equilibrium solution first. Since individual firms’
only perceive their negligible impact on the total resource flows, they treat dR as
constant. The first-order conditions are given by (2.10), (2.11), (2.13), (2.14), (2.15),
(2.16) and (2.17). So firm behavior in equilibrium would not change as a result of
including costs of pollution. The paths of b, r and i would be same as when pollution
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was not included. The energy profile for a representative firm would be given by
figure 2.1. Pollution in terms of a damage cost would only affect firm net profits in
equilibrium.
In this model with pollution, the social planner internalizes the external benefits
of investments in knowledge as well as the effect of pollution from aggregate use of the
exhaustible resource. So imposing the two aggregate consistency conditions N = n
and R = r the maximization problem for the planner solution can now be written as
max
∫ ∞
t=0
(
(b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
n
)
b− i− dr
)
e−ρtdt (2.52)
s.t. (2.4), (2.5), (2.8) and (2.50). n0 and s0 are given. The other parameters remain
the same as before. The subsequent Hamiltonian can be written as
H = (b+ r)1−α −
(
q + a
n
)
b− i− dr + λ1
√
i− λ2r + θ1b+ θ2r + θ3i
λi’s denote the respective shadow prices and θi’s are the Lagrange multipliers associ-
ated with the controls. λi, θi ≥ 0.
Taking the necessary conditions for an optimal solution, we get (2.11), (2.13),
(2.14), (2.15), (2.16) and (2.46). The first-order condition with respect to r now
changes to
∂H
∂r
= (1− α)(b+ r)−α − d− λ2 + θ2 = 0, rθ2 = 0 (2.53)
Because pollution arises from aggregate use of the exhaustible resource, the only
difference for the planner solution when pollution costs are included lies in the first-
order condition for r.
It would be useful to state that we use parameter values of α = 0.667, ρ = 0.04,
β = 0.33, q = 1, a = 5, s0 = 1 and n0 = 1 similar to when pollution was not included.
The size of the pollution parameter “d” relative to “q”(the portion of the average
backstop cost that cannot be influenced through knowledge accumulation) plays a
crucial role in the solution for optimum paths of investment, resource and backstop
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use. With a relatively high value of d, the shadow price of the resource stock (λ2) falls
to zero. From the necessary conditions we see that λ2 grows at the rate of discount:
that is to say, if λ2 begins at zero (for a relatively high value of d), it would equal
zero forever. The discovery of an additional unit of the exhaustible resource would
not have any effect on discounted lifetime net profits.
However, since d is a constant, the above necessary conditions would still imply
interior or corner solutions for the three control variables b, r and i. Investment i is
given by (2.20) as before. Investment would always be positive as the marginal benefit
of investing zero units in knowledge is infinity compared to a constant marginal cost
of one.
2.5.2 Two Phases
Proceeding as in the previous model without pollution, we would have phases of only
using the resource or the backstop. However, we would begin with the case when
both the resource and the backstop are used in positive amounts. That is, (b > 0,
r > 0, ⇒ θ1 = θ2 = 0). The first-order conditions would then reduce to
(1− α)(b+ r)−α = λ2 + d (2.54)
and (2.18). Since the resource and the backstop are perfect substitutes and have
equal marginal benefits, these two equations imply that their marginal costs can only
be equal at one point in time. So we would have an indeterminate division between b
and r at this point in time. Total optimal energy use e∗ when both the resource and
backstop are used is given by
e∗ =
(
1− α
q + a
n
) 1
α
=
( 1− α
λ2 + d
) 1
α
(2.55)
When only using the exhaustible resource (r > 0, b = 0 ⇒ θ1 > 0, θ2 = 0), the
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energy profile is given by
e∗ = r∗ =
( 1− α
λ2 + d
) 1
α
(2.56)
and θ1 =
(
q + a
n
)
− λ2 − d. Given the parameters of the model, optimal resource use
r may fall over time or remain constant depending on whether λ2 begins at zero or
some positive value.
Finally, the path of only backstop use (b > 0, r = 0 ⇒ θ1 = 0, θ2 > 0) is given by
(2.28) as before. The optimal path of θ2 is θ2 = λ2 + d−
(
q + a
n
)
.
As stated before, we will not have a period of simulataneous use of the resource
and the backstop even when pollution is introduced to the model. Total energy
“e∗” is produced using the cheaper input in any given time period. If the resource
is cheap relative to the backstop, the planner would want to use the resource first
before switching to the backstop. The marginal cost of the backstop is always positive
but the marginal cost of the resource now consists of its shadow price as well as the
pollution cost d. We make the implicit assumption that a switch can only be made
from using the resource to the backstop and not in the opposite direction. In that case
the planner would want to use the resource first until λ2 + d equals the marginal cost
of the backstop or
(
q + a
n
)
. The time of switch to the backstop technology depends
on when the marginal costs of the two energy inputs are equalized and not necessarily
whether the initial resource stock is completely exhausted at the time. Intuitively,
given any λ2 if d >
(
q + a
n0
)
, the planner would switch to the backstop from the
very beginning. The initial stock of the resource is left intact in this case. Denoting
the time of switch from the exhaustible resource to the backstop technology by T as
before, the following conditions would be useful in determining T
λ2(t) ≥ 0 (2.57)
∫ T
0
r(t)dt ≤ s0 (2.58)
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λ2(T )
(∫ T
0
r(t)dt− s0
)
= 0 (2.59)
and,
λ2(T ) + d = q +
a
nT
(2.60)
Equations (2.57) and (2.58) are derived from constraints for the maximization prob-
lem. Equation (2.59) indicates that the net stock of the resource valued at its shadow
price should equal zero at the time of switch T . It shows that some stock of the
resource may be left in the ground if its shadow price falls to zero: the resource is
completely exhausted only if its shadow price is positive at the time of switch to
the backstop. We would have a trivial case when the initial resource stock is com-
pletely exhausted and its shadow price falls to zero. Equation (2.60) indicates that
the marginal costs of the two energy inputs should equal at the time of switch.
Although the optimal energy profile would have phases of only resource or only
backstop use, the pollution parameter d plays a crucial role in determining its shape.
Figure 2.14 shows the optimal energy profiles for various values of the pollution
parameter d. We see that the path of resource use gets flatter as d increases. The
Figure 2.14 Optimal energy profiles for various values of d
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time of switch to the backstop represented by the kink in energy profiles also shifts
to the right if d rises from 0.6 to 2. For d = 3, the path of resource use is completely
flat and switch to the backstop occurs sooner at around 10 years. When d = 6, there
is no path of resource use and switch to the backstop is made at the very beginning.
The above phenomena can be explained as follows. An increase in the unit cost of
pollution d makes the resource less valuable. The shadow price of the resource stock
at time zero (λ2(0)) falls when d increases (table 2.2 clearly illustrates the effect).
This makes the planner delay resource extraction and conserve it for longer periods.
Given (2.59), this would still imply complete exhaustion at the time of switch to
the backstop. For a critical value of d ≥ 2.57, λ2(0) falls to zero. We compute this
critical value using numerical methods. Since an additional unit of the resource stock
does not add to discounted lifetime net profits, the planner would find it optimal to
leave some of the stock in the ground when switching completely to the backstop
technology. d = 2.57 is the knife-edge case when λ2(0) = 0 and there is complete
exhaustion of the given initial resource stock. From (2.56), we see λ2(0) = 0 implies
a constant path of resource extraction. Switch to the backstop would be sooner given
(2.60). It should be noted that as long as d <
(
q + a
n0
)
, the optimal energy profile
would include a path of non-renewable resource use followed by a path of backstop
use. Given the parameters of the model, d = 6 represents the case when marginal
cost of the resource is at least as high as the initial marginal cost of the backstop. In
this case, the backstop is adopted immediately leaving all of the initial resource stock
in the ground. The following lemma explains the condition for λ2(0) = 0.
• Lemma 1: d > q is a necessary but not sufficient condition for λ2(0) = 0.
• Proof: Given (2.13), λ2(0) = 0 ⇒ λ2(T ) = 0 for t = T . Then equation (2.60),
⇒ nT = ad−q where T denotes the time of switch to the backstop. As nT > 0,⇒
d > q. Given the values of the parameters and solving the model numerically,
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as d ≥ 2.57 for λ2(0) = 0, the above lemma is proved.
Recall that pollution only affects firm profits in equilibrium. As a comparison,
figure 2.15 plots energy profiles for the optimal and equilibrium solution for various
values of d. The dashed curves represent the optimal energy profiles when pollution
Figure 2.15 Combined energy profiles for d = 0.6, d = 2, d = 2.6 and d = 3
is included to the model. The solid lines are paths of the optimal and equilibrium
solutions for the case without pollution. Firm behavior doesn’t change when pollution
is included to the model; in case of the optimal solution, flow pollution would only
affect the first phase of the energy profile when using the exhaustible resource. They
would eventually merge together after the switch is made to the backstop.
Figure 2.15 shows that the time of switch to the backstop increases for the optimal
solution when pollution is introduced to the model. This was explained previously
that as long as the unit cost of pollution is below a critical value, a rise in the cost
of pollution would make the planner conserve the resource for a longer period. As
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long as the initial shadow price of the resource stock is positive for 0 ≤ d ≤ 2.57,
the given stock of the resource is fully exhausted at the time of switch. From the
previous section without pollution, the time of switch to the backstop equalled 17.8
years for the equilibrium solution and 14.7 years for the optimal one. When pollution
is introduced, the time of switch increases to around 19.3 years for d = 2. For values
of d > 2.57 but in its close neighborhood, although the resource would not be fully
exhausted when the switch to the backstop occurs, it is used at a slow constant rate
but for a longer period compared to the case without pollution. This can be seen
for d = 2.6 when T increases to 18.6 years from 14.7 years for the optimal solution
without pollution. For a higher d value, at d = 3, the given stock of resource is not
fully exhausted and the time of switch to the backstop actually reduces to 10 years.
As an illustration, figure 2.16 shows the time of switch to the backstop T as
a function of the unit pollution cost d. We see that for low enough values of d
Figure 2.16 Time of switch as function of pollution
parameter d
(d ≤ 2.57), the time of switch to the backstop increases with an increase in the
pollution parameter. However for higher values of d (d > 2.57), the time of switchover
decreases as the shadow price of the resource stock falls to zero.
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2.5.3 Finding the Switching Time
2.5.3.1 Exhaustion Condition
The method of getting solutions of the system remains largely the same even after
the introduction of pollution. We assume a given value of d and do this exercise for
various values of d. The time T at which the economy switches from the phase of only
using the resource to that of only using the backstop can be found by combining the
first-order conditions and constraints. We once again resort to numerical methods to
find this.
We first assume that the resource is fully exhausted at the time of switch. Substi-
tuting the optimal path of resource use (2.56) in the resource exhaustability constraint
(2.30), we get
∫ T
0
(
1− α
λ2(0)eρt + d
) 1
α
dt = s0 (2.61)
Assuming energy use is continuous, we can once again use the property from (2.35):
rT = bT or the rate of resource extraction is the same as the rate of backstop produc-
tion at the time of the switch T . This also allows us to relate rT to nT or the stock
of knowledge at the time of switchover.
Suppose at this stage that we know rT . But because of the form of (2.61), we
cannot get closed form solutions of T and λ2(0) as functions of rT , or to move forward,
of nT . Picking various values of λ2(0) and T (given s0), and using (2.61) we get an
interpolating function between the two. We plot the function in figure 2.17. Note
the function shown in figure 2.17 is only defined for values of T such that λ2(0) ≥ 0.
Note also the function has a negative intercept; since λ2(0) < 0 is not possible, we
restrict λ2(0) = 0 for T ≤ T0. We obtain T0 substituting λ2(0) = 0 in (2.61) given the
parameters of the model. When λ2(0) = 0 however, the given stock of the resource
may not be exhausted as an additional unit of the resource stock does not add to
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Figure 2.17 λ2(0) as function of T : here lam2z stands
for λ2(0) and timedepl for T
discounted lifetime net profits. For T < T0, some resource will be left in the ground
at the time of switch to the backstop. T = T0 is the knife-edge case when the given
stock of the resource s0 is completely exhausted with λ2(0) = 0.
2.5.3.2 Knowledge Condition
As in the case without pollution, we begin in Phase 2 (r = 0, b > 0) to find the key
value nT or the stock of knowledge at the time of switchover. Since the optimum path
of backstop use remains unchanged for the planner solution even after the introduction
of pollution, we use the same methods as before to arrive at the key relation (2.42)
(where x ≡ λ1(0)).
Now, (2.60) can be modified as
λ2(0) =
(
q + a
nT
− d
)
e−ρT (2.62)
Since λ2(0) and nT in the above equation can be further replaced by the interpolating
function found above and x from (2.42) respectively, we arrive at an interpolating
function similar to T = g(x), g′(x) > 0 for the case without pollution. With (2.43)
(T = z(x), z′(x) < 0), these equations give us the optimum values of the time of
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switch T ∗ and the initial shadow price of the knowledge stock λ1∗(0).
Choosing some random values of d, we repeat the above process to find various
optimal times of switch and initial shadow prices of the knowledge stock. Using the
interpolating function between T and λ2(0) found above, we find that the optimal
initial shadow price of the resource (λ∗2(0)) keeps on falling with increases in d: at
d = 2.57, λ∗2(0) ≈ 0 as shown in table 2.2. For d > 2.57, we get λ∗2(0) < 0 and so we
ignore the solution to satisfy optimality. We assume λ∗2(0) = 0 for these cases. Using
(2.60), we get n∗T as a pure number given the parameters of the model. Equation
(2.42) then gives us x∗ ≡ λ∗1(0) using which we get T ∗ from (2.43).
Once we find the numerical solutions discussed above, r∗T and r∗(0) can be obtained
from the first-order conditions. The optimal path of resource use would either be
falling over time or remain constant depending on λ∗2(0). The optimal initial value of
investment (i∗(0)) can then be found from (2.20) using λ∗1(0).
2.5.4 Investment and Profits
2.5.4.1 Investment
Since firm behavior in the competitive equilibrium does not change when pollution
costs are included, the paths of λ1 and hence i would be unchanged. For the planner
solution, the only difference compared to the case when pollution was not included
arises in the first-order condition for r. Thus the policy functions would be given by
(2.41) in Phase 1 (r > 0, b = 0) and (2.48) in Phase 2 (r = 0, b > 0) respectively. But
because of changes in values of T ∗, λ∗1(0) and n∗T , a change in optimum investment
profiles would be seen in its upward or downward shifts relative to the case without
pollution.
Figure 2.18 plots investment profiles as a function of the knowledge stock for both
the equilibrium and the optimal solutions for various values of d. The dashed curves
represent the optimal investment profiles when pollution is introduced to the model.
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Figure 2.18 Combined investment profiles for
d = 0.6, d = 2, d = 3 and d = 6
The solid lines are investment paths for the equilibrium and optimal solutions when
pollution is not included. The points of kink in the investment profiles in figure 2.18
correspond to the accumulated stock of knowledge at the time of switch to the back-
stop or nT . We observe that optimum investment is much bigger than investment in
the equilibrium solution even after the introduction of pollution. Optimal investment
profiles move down and to the right for d = 0.6 and d = 2 before finally merging
with the one in the no pollution case. This is because for 0 < d ≤ 2.57, a rise in the
pollution cost streches the life of the resource over longer periods. Slower extraction
implies lower investment during the period of only resource use. However the rise
in nT relative to the case without pollution can be explained by the increase in T
dominating the fall in investment each period. For d = 3, the rise in initial invest-
ment shown by a movement up and to the left for the optimum investment profile
corresponds to a lower nT than for the case without pollution. Since the switch to the
backstop is made much sooner compared to when there is no pollution, the fall in T
now dominates the rise in investment each period. When d = 6, the stock of knowl-
edge at the time of switch corresponds to the initial given knowledge stock n0 as the
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backstop is adopted from the very beginning. Investment falls after the switchover
time with accumulation of more knowledge.
We show optimum investment profiles over time for various values of d in figure
2.19. Investment profiles over time resemble paths of investment as a function of
Figure 2.19 Optimal investment profiles over time with
pollution
the knowledge stock. Figure 2.19 shows that initial investment falls as d increases
from 0.6 to 2 with a rightward shift in the point of kink for the investment profile.
The point of kink here denotes the time of switch to the backstop technology. The
time of switchover increases from 15.8 to 19.3 years when d rises from 0.6 to 2.
Following similar logic as before, for 0 < d ≤ 2.57, a rise in the pollution cost implies
slower resource extraction and lesser investments each period when only using the
exhaustible resource. So for d = 3 as λ2(0) = 0, an additional unit of the resource
stock does not add to discounted lifetime net profits. Optimal investments in the
stock of knowledge will thus be carried out at a greater rate and the time of switch
decreases to 9.8 years.
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2.5.4.2 Profits
Costs of pollution do not affect firm behavior and only reduce a representative firm’s
net profits through the additional component dR.
Figure 2.20 shows profit profiles for the equilibrium solution both without pol-
lution and for different values of the pollution cost d. The dashed lines represent
Figure 2.20 Equilibrium net profits for various
values of d
equilibrium profits for various values of d. The solid line shows firm profits for the
case without pollution. That pollution costs only reduce firms’ net profits are shown
in figure 2.20 by downward shifts of the profit profile during the period of only re-
source use when d increases from 0.6 to 6. Because the nature of pollution included
in this model is a flow rather than a stock, it would only affect a representative firm’s
net profits when using the exhaustible resource. Profits are identical for a firm in
equilibrium whether or not facing pollution costs after the switch to the backstop.
This is shown in figure 2.20 as the profit profiles merge.
For the optimal solution however, the time of switch to the backstop (T ) changes
after pollution is introduced to the model. So profit profiles would exhibit a similar
shape to the case without pollution except the period when there is a discontinuity
or “jump”, if any, in net profits. Figure 2.21 shows optimal profit profiles for various
62
values of the pollution parameter d. The diagram shows that a “jump” in profits
Figure 2.21 Optimum net profits for various values of d
corresponding to the time of switch to the backstop moves rightward when 0.6 ≤ d ≤
2. As explained in the section on energy profiles, the shadow price of the resource
stock is positive in this range. Following (2.49) and (2.60) imposing N = n and
R = r and assuming that total energy use is continuous (rT = bT ), the magnitude of
this jump in net profits at time T equals the difference between d and
(
q + a
nT
)
. So
for d ≥ 2.57 when λ2(0) = 0, there would not be any discontinuity in the path for
optimal net profits. This can be seen for the profit profiles in figure 2.21 corresponding
to d = 3 and d = 6 where the time of switch to the backstop also falls. For d ≥ 6,
optimal profit profiles would be a smooth concave function as the backstop is adopted
from the very beginning.
Figure 2.22 plots profit profiles for the optimal solution both without pollution and
for various values of d. The dashed paths in figure 2.22 show optimal profit profiles
when pollution is included to the model. The solid line depicts optimal profits for
the previous case without pollution. Because of added pollution costs of dR during
the period of only resource use, net profits are lower in the first phase relative to
when pollution is not included. The jump in profit profiles, if any, is also shorter
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Figure 2.22 Optimum net profits with and without pollution for d = 0.6, d = 2 and
d = 3
when we add pollution to the model. This is because the jump in profits now equals(
d−
(
q + a
nT
))
compared to only
(
q + a
nT
)
for the case without pollution. Since the
resource is used for longer periods for d = 0.6 and d = 2 relative to when pollution
is not included, this leads to a higher accumulated knowledge stock at the times
of switch to the backstop technology. At these switchpoints of 15.8 and 19.3 years
respectively from figure 2.22, optimal profits are higher when pollution is included
because of more backstop use and also lower average costs for the backstop. For
d = 3 because of a sooner switch to the backstop, the accumulated knowledge stock
at 9.8 years would be less than the corresponding one for the case without pollution.
Optimal profits would thus be lower. Optimal profits are identical during the period
of only backstop use for both cases when pollution is and is not included to the model.
So the two profiles eventually merge after their respective switch points.
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2.5.5 Numerical Solutions with Flow Pollution
Table 2.2 shows some key numerical solutions for the social planner for different values
of d and when pollution is not included to the model.
Table 2.2 Optimal solutions for various values of d
Pollution Cost λ∗1(0) i∗(0) λ∗2(0) r∗(0) nˆ = n∗T T ∗ % of s0 used
no poll. (d = 0) 0.189 0.009 1.521 0.103 2.884 14.655 100
d = 0.6 0.178 0.008 1.109 0.086 2.962 15.833 100
d = 0.9 0.172 0.007 0.913 0.079 3.002 16.487 100
d = 2 0.148 0.005 0.268 0.056 3.162 19.323 100
d = 2.57 0.134 0.004 0.0003 ≈ 0 0.047 3.263 21.413 100
d = 2.6 0.154 0.006 0 0.046 3.125 18.636 85.5
d = 3 0.249 0.015 0 0.037 2.5 9.838 36.4
d = 4 0.395 0.039 0 0.024 1.667 3.166 7.6
d = 6 0.539 0.072 0 - 1≡ n0 0 0
All the variables are measured in terms of the composite commodity y. An increase
in the cost of pollution forces the planner to conserve the resource longer as long as
an extra unit of the resource stock adds to discounted lifetime net profits. Initial
resource extraction falls from 0.086 to 0.056 when d rises from 0.6 to 2. An increase
in the life of the resource also causes current investment in the backstop to be worth
less because of discounting. This fall in the initial shadow price of knowledge (λ1(0))
causes initial investment levels to decrease from 0.008 to 0.005 for the corresponding
d values. However, as the time of switch to the backstop T increases at a greater
rate, the accumulated knowledge stock at T rises. The accumulated knowledge stock
nT increases from 2.96 to 3.16 when T increases from 15.83 to 19.32 years with a rise
in d from 0.6 to 2. For values of d > 2.57 but in its close neighborhood, the resource
is used at a constant rate but for longer periods compared to when pollution is not
included to the model. So accumulated knowledge stocks would still be larger with
pollution compared to the baseline case of no pollution (d = 0) even when the shadow
price of the resource stock (λ2(0)) becomes zero. Comparing the cases of d = 2.57
and d = 2.6, we see that although initial investment in the knowledge stock increases,
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nT falls because of a shorter time of switch. That initial investment is valued more
is shown by a higher λ1(0) when d rises from 2.57 to 2.6. For higher values of d, we
see that accumulated knowledge stocks at the time of switch would be lower than for
the case without pollution because of a very short period of only using the resource.
For d = 6, investment falls over time from its initial value of 0.072 as the stock of
knowledge increases from n0. The last column of table 2.2 shows how the amount of
the initial resource stock s0 extracted at the time of switch varies with an increase in
the unit pollution cost d. For values of d ≤ q and for certain higher values of d as long
as λ2(0) > 0, there would always be complete exhaustion of the given stock of the
resource. d = 2.57 represents the knife-edge case when the shadow price of the stock
of resource falls to zero and there is also a complete exhaustion of the initial resource
stock (s0) at the time of switch. For d > 2.57, say when d rises from 2.6 to 4, the
percent of the initial stock extracted falls from 85.5% to 7.6%. We summarize how
the relation between d and q affects the exhaustion of the initial resource stock s0 in
figure 2.23. s(T ) in figure 2.23 represents amount of resource left in the ground at
Figure 2.23 Relation between d and q and
exhaustion of s0
the date of switch to the backstop and for points along the diagonal d = q holds. The
box in figure 2.23 shows that for d < q (upper triangle) there is complete exhaustion
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of the initial resource stock so that s(T ) = 0. This would also be true for points
along the diagonal. When d > q (lower triangle) however, three possible cases can
arise: the resource stock would be completely exhausted if d ≤ 2.57, some of the
stock would be left behind for 2.57 < d < 6 and d ≥ 6 implies all of the stock would
be left unused at the date of switch to the backstop.
2.6 Conclusion
We assume an economy consisting of infinitely lived firms and individuals with each
individual owning one firm. There is also a continuum of identical firms. The firm’s
total output (or the composite commodity) is produced using an exhaustible resource
and a backstop technology assumed to be in nearly unlimited supply. The resource
is free to extract but there is a cost associated with using the backstop. Firms’
can however reduce the average cost of the backstop through private investments in
knowledge.
We analyze firm behavior in the competitive equilibrium solution and the social
planner solution where a representative firm maximizes total profits net of the cost
of backstop and investment costs. In both cases, we find that firms would first use
the resource and then switch completely to the backstop. An interesting feature
of the model is that firms would always invest positive amounts in the equilibrium
or optimal solutions. For the competitive equilibrium, firms do not fully realize
the external benefits of their own investment decisions. This underinvestment in
knowledge by firms leads to a slower extraction of the exhaustible resource compared
to the optimal solution. The planner invests more in knowledge every period and
switches earlier to the backstop technology. We use numerical methods and find that
a firm does better overall in the planner solution compared to the equilibrium one as
one would expect.
We then proceed to the case when flow pollution is introduced to the model.
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Pollution is caused by aggregate resource use by all firms in the economy. We find that
equilibrium behavior by firms do not change from when pollution was not included.
Flow pollution only affect net profits for a representative firm in the equilibrium
solution. But results do change significantly for the optimal solution. The size of
the average pollution cost relative to the (constant part) of the average cost of the
backstop determines whether the resource is exhausted sooner or later with a rise
in the cost of pollution. For relatively low values of the average pollution cost,
the planner would want to prolong the life of the resource stock and invest little
amounts in knowledge every period when the cost of pollution increases. For pollution
costs above a certain threshold, an increase in pollution costs imply a faster rate of
extraction of the resource and greater investments in knowledge each period. In
these cases, the resource is not completely exhausted when a firm switches from the
resource to the backstop. For very high average pollution costs, the resource stock is
left totally unused and the backstop technology is adopted from the very beginning.
Our future research ideas include doing some sensitivity analysis with regard to
the externality parameter β and including stock pollution. Since β is the dial for
measuring the private vs. the public benefits of investments in knowledge for a rep-
resentative firm, assigning different values can have interesting effects on the optimal
paths of resource extraction, investment and the date of switch to the backstop tech-
nology. Some comparative static analysis can also be done. Lastly, we are interested
in replacing flow pollution with stock pollution while keeping the same structure as in
the current model. We think it would have significant effects on the model dynamics
and the initial values of the control variables.
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Chapter 3
Dirty and clean technologies
Abstract
Pollution from fossil fuel use is a global problem. Studies have shown
that a worsening of environmental quality has adverse effects on worker
productivity and health. In our paper, we have an inexhaustible natu-
ral resource which deteriorates environmental quality. There also exists a
clean backstop technology which may initially be too costly to operate and
whose costs are reduced through investments in knowledge. We get intu-
itive results which show that, depending if we begin with a clean (dirty)
environment, only the resource (backstop) would be used in decreasing
(increasing) amounts until we reach a constant steady state at a large
knowledge level. Simultaneous use of the resource and backstop is only
possible at this level of the stock of knowledge. Our model fits well with
reality showing that gradual investments in alternative technologies while
only using dirty natural resources can help us make the eventual switch to
clean sources of energy thereby attaining a better environmental quality.
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3.1 Introduction
The problem of exhaustible resources in production and consumption possibilities
has been dealt in detail over the last few decades. One of the earliest works are
by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) who showed that physical capital
accumulation from an early period may help maintain consumption levels as long as
some stock of the resource is always used. However, in recent years, the focus has
shifted from this essential aspect of exhaustible resources to its pollution problems.
The issues of global warming and climate change are already clear and as these and
other changes become more pronounced in the coming decades, they are likely to
present greater challenges to our environment. In this regard, many countries have
been trying to move to cleaner energies by depending less on coal and oil and more
on alternative sources such as wind, solar, natural gas, hydro and nuclear. In our
paper, we show that a significant cost from deteriorating environmental quality can
determine the time of switch from a polluting natural resource to a cleaner backstop
technology.
Global warming can occur because of emissions of large amounts of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Human activities such as burning of
fossil fuels to produce energy, deforestation and some industrial processes are largely
responsible for it. On the other hand, ozone pollution over a number of years, leading
to depletion of the ozone layer, can also cause global warming. Ozone pollution
is formed from complex interactions between nitrogen oxides (NOx) and Volatile
Organic Compounds (VOCs), both of which are caused by motor vehicle exhausts
and industrial emissions. In a study by Graff Zivin and Neidell (2011), the authors
show that ozone pollution negatively affects worker productivity. They analyze data
on farm workers and find that ozone pollution harms productivity even in cases where
labor supply is unaffected.
The effects of global warming and climate change are serious. According to the
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United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), change in global average
temperatures by even one to two degrees can significantly reduce crop yields and
increase rainfall during heavy precipitation events thus increasing flooding risk. These
can have profound effects on agriculture-based developing countries causing economic
and social depression. Some other effects of global warming are oceans warming up
and becoming more acidic, melting of ice caps and rising sea levels.
We model pollution through a deterioration of environmental quality. Studies
(Margulis 1992, Alfsen et. al. 1992, Pearce and Warford 1993, Brendemoen and
Vennemo 1994) have shown that nonextractive services provided by the environment
can increase the productivity of inputs in the production process. Some examples
are the impact of soil and air quality on productivity in the agricultural sector and
the effect of air quality on mental health and physical depreciation of equipment.
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) factor environmental quality as a nonrival input in
the production process and as a pure consumption good. They employ an endoge-
nous growth model where environmental quality worsens because of pollution or the
extractive use of the environment. The main result of the paper shows that, when an
exogenous pollution ceiling is implemented through a pollution tax, the short-term
effects on key variables such as consumption, output and environmental quality are
different than long-term effects on these variables. While short-term effects on the
level and growth rate of consumption and output maybe adverse, they may improve
in the long-term. Here, environmental quality converges to its steady state in the
long run. In our model, environmental quality only enters as a state variable. We
also do not have any correction mechanism such as a tax or subsidy. We find that
output always grows whereas environmental quality may improve or worsen along the
optimal transition path. Both output and environmental quality settle at constant
values in the long run.
Some papers that have included nonrenewable resources in the context of an en-
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dogenous growth model are Barbier (1999), Schou (2000) and Grimaud and Rougé
(2005, 2008). For Schou (2000) and Grimaud and Rougé (2005, 2008), the nonrenew-
able resource is essential and causes pollution. In Barbier (1999), resource scarcity
disrupts the process of innovation. The literature on endogenous growth models with
nonrenewable resources usually compares the long run steady states for the optimal
and equilibrium solutions and suggests an environmental policy which brings the two
solutions closer. In Grimaud and Rougé (2005), slowing down resource extraction in
the equilibrium solution is done using a decreasing tax on exhaustible resource use.
For Grimaud and Rougé (2008), an optimal environmental policy is either a tax on
use of the resource or a subsidy to green research increasing the stock of knowledge
specific to a produced input of production. We can cite the distinct result of Schou
(2000) in this case. The author finds that taxes are unnecessary as a market econ-
omy exactly mimics a socially planned economy. This is because the direct marginal
product of the resource and its negative external effect (because of flow pollution in
the model) both grow at the same rate. More interestingly, a higher negative external
effect of pollution makes the planner conserve the resource longer leading to a larger
optimal long run growth rate.
In our setup, the production function involves a natural resource and a backstop
technology which are perfect substitutes. Only the natural resource deteriorates
environmental quality causing pollution. In contrast to standard endogenous growth
models, the natural resource is not an essential input in production. So we do not
analyze the difference between an optimal and equilibrium steady state and impose
a tax to slow down resource extraction in equilibrium. Our goal is to find out the
time of switch from the natural resource to the backstop and the time path for
environmental quality. The time of switch occurs when the marginal costs of the
natural resource and the backstop become equal. For purposes of tractability, we do
not include resource extraction costs (Schou (2000)), and assume that the resource is
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in infinite supply. However, there are costs attached to using the backstop technology.
Our paper is similar to Tsur and Zemel (2003, 2005) in that backstop costs fall due
to R&D efforts as it increases the knowledge base. In addition, both of these papers
include a nonrenewable resource and a perfect substitute alternative technology. In
Tsur and Zemel (2003), the time of switch from the resource to the backstop coincides
with when the marginal costs of the two become equal. This also corresponds with the
date of exhaustion of the nonrenewable resource. The authors have simultaneous use
of the resource and backstop which is followed by periods of only using the backstop.
As in Hung and Quyen (1993), backstop takes an increasing share prior to depletion
so that there is no discontinuous jump in the exhaustible resource supply.
Tsur and Zemel (2005) define the evolution and long-run behavior of an economy
based on its production technology, learning ability and its endowment of physical
capital and knowledge stock. The authors distinguish between potentially growing
and converging economies such that converging economies settle at a steady state
whereas potentially growing economies forever experience growing stocks of knowl-
edge and capital given sufficient endowments. Analyzing first the case with an infinite
resource stock, the authors find that converging economies endowed with low enough
capital and knowledge stocks would invest the maximum possible amount in R&D and
then converge to a constant steady state. Here, increases in the stock of knowledge
due to R&D activities shrink the use of the resource. On the other hand, potentially
growing economies follow a most rapid R&D approach and keep growing provided
they are endowed with sufficient stocks of knowledge and capital. This result is simi-
lar to Tsur and Zemel (2003) where the knowledge accumulation process begins right
away and at the highest possible rate and slows down later on as more knowledge
is accumulated. Our paper follows a similar pattern such that investment in R&D
activities falls to zero after the knowledge stock hits its upper limit. We impose this
upper limit at a very large knowledge level when the backstop becomes so cheap that
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further investments in knowledge are not worthwhile.
In Tsur and Zemel (2005), for a finite resource stock, the results are largely un-
changed compared to the first case with an infinite resource supply. The authors show
that resource scarcity may encourage greater R&D efforts in initially resource-poor
economies because of increased reliance on the backstop. This implies that although
only the backstop is used in the long-run, a resource-poor economy will find itself
with more knowledge and capital stocks than an otherwise identical economy with
unlimited resource.
Our contribution to the above literature lies in modeling pollution as a deteriora-
tion of environmental quality in the context of a perfect substitute production func-
tion including a resource and a backstop. We have a representative firm maximizing
profits net of input costs and a damage cost arising out of deteriorating environmen-
tal quality. A damage cost can be thought of lowering worker productivity or poor
worker health affecting production for the firm. The interesting feature of our model
lies in the interplay between a free but polluting natural resource and a clean but
costly backstop. We show that a firm in the optimal solution will only use the cheaper
input initially until converging to a constant steady state involving simultaneous use
of both the resource and the backstop. We first introduce the case when backstop
costs are constant. Then we move on to where knowledge accumulation reduces the
high initial average costs of the backstop. Our results remain largely the same for
the latter case showing gradual investments in knowledge from an initial period helps
the firm to make the eventual switch to the backstop. For the equilibrium solution
however, knowledge accumulation does not make a difference as a representative firm
always uses the resource and never switches to the alternative technology.
A limitation of our model comes from the fact that total output is produced
using only energy. As in similar papers by Tsur and Zemel (2003, 2005), we do not
include physical capital accumulation which is affected by the decisions of resource
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extraction and investment in R&D. This is mainly done to keep the model simple
and to answer the question of when a firm would find it optimal to switch completely
to an alternative technology when it is directly affected by pollution damages. We
find intuitive results in that use of only the resource or backstop in the first stage
depends on the initial stock of environmental quality. Consequently, environmental
quality may improve or worsen before settling at a steady state.
The paper is organized as follows. We provide our main model in Section 2. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 solve for special cases when we do not have knowledge accumulation and
when knowledge accumulation is included to reduce the average cost of the backstop
technology. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider a model consisting of a continuum of measure 1 of identical firms. Each
firm is owned by an infinitely-lived household. We abstract from population growth
and for simplicity, we normalize the total population in the economy to be unity.
A firm in the economy produces a “composite commodity ”using a natural resource
and a backstop technology. The composite commodity is used for both consumption
and investment. Energy, or the sum of the use of the natural resource and the
backstop, can be regarded as the only input for a representative firm. We assume
both the natural resource and the backstop to be in nearly unlimited supply. We
would henceforth refer to the resource as the “dirty technology” and the backstop as
the “clean technology.”
The costs of production for a firm are divided into costs of the dirty and clean
technologies. There are no costs of extraction for the dirty technology. The only cost
associated with its use is the cost of pollution which adversely affects the profits of
the representative firm. The firm faces positive unit costs for the clean technology
each period. However, continuous investments in knowledge out of the composite
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commodity helps reduce these costs over time. We follow a specification similar to
Tsur and Zemel (2005) in this case. Knowledge can be thought of as the technical
know-how to operate alternative clean technologies like wind and solar. Investments
through R&D may bring about more efficient techniques to use these technologies
which may cut down their average costs.
The production function for the composite commodity is given by
y = eα (3.1)
where y denotes the composite commodity and e denotes total energy use. 0 < α < 1.
All firms are assumed price-takers and entry and exit is not permitted in the model.
For simplicity, we take the price of the composite commodity y to be constant at
unity.
Total energy production is in turn given by
e = b+ r (3.2)
where b ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0 represent use of the clean and dirty technologies by a repre-
sentative firm.
Although the dirty technology (natural resource) is assumed to be in unlimited
supply, there is a feasible limit r¯ that firms can extract in any given time period given
their production techniques. So we impose r ≤ r¯ as a feasible technology constraint.
Turning to the costs of b and r, the average cost of the clean technology as a
function of the knowledge level is given by
C(n) = a0 − a1(N1−βnβ) (3.3)
n denotes the level of knowledge for an individual firm whereas N denotes the aggre-
gate level of knowledge for the whole economy. Each firm is endowed with the same
amount of the initial knowledge stock and so there is no possibility of trade between
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firms. a0 > a1 > 0 are the cost parameters of the model. The above problem leads to
a divergence between the competitive equilibrium and the socially optimal solutions.
The externality parameter β > 0 captures the degree of external vs. private benefits
of knowledge accumulation by a representative firm. For the equilibrium solution,
firms’ underestimate the effect of their own investment decision on the aggregate
stock of knowledge N . Thus they treat N as constant. In contrast, the social planner
fully realizes the external benefits of investments in knowledge and therefore invests
more in knowledge every period compared to an individual firm. Hence this will cause
a bigger decline in the average cost of the clean technology.
We define the range of the externality parameter to be 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. There are
two special cases of β = 0 and β = 1. If β = 0 all benefits of investment are fully
external and an individual firm in equilibrium cannot reduce the unit cost of the clean
technology in any way. When β = 1, all benefits of investment are fully internalized
and this case coincides with the optimal solution.
A representative firm invests in knowledge out of total production. The knowledge
accumulation function is given by
n˙ = a
√
i (3.4)
a > 0 represents the investment parameter and i ≥ 0 denotes investment each period
for a firm. n0 > 0 denotes the initial endowment of knowledge stock for a representa-
tive firm. A concave knowledge accumulation function implies that it pays to invest
little amounts every period than a lot in any one period. We impose a ceiling on n
after which investments in knowledge do not further reduce the average cost of the
clean technology. We denote this maximal level of knowledge by n¯. Investment being
worthless falls to zero beyond this point.
In our setup, we capture pollution through adverse effects on environmental qual-
ity. Environmental quality is denoted by A in the model. The initial stock of en-
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vironmental quality is given by A0 > 0. Environmental quality worsens due to use
of the dirty technology by all firms but regenerates at a constant rate γ > 0. We
assume that there is a pristine level of environmental quality denoted by A¯. The
motion equation for A is given by
A˙ = (A¯− A)γ −R (3.5)
where R denotes the aggregate use of resource r by each firm in the economy.
A representative firm maximizes the discounted flow of net profit over an infinite
horizon. Net profits in any period is given by the market value of the composite com-
modity net of the cost of the clean technology and a damage cost due to deteriorating
environmental quality.
The maximization problem for a representative firm j can be written as
max
∫ ∞
t=0
(
y − C(n)b− (A¯− A)2
)
e−ρtdt (3.6)
subject to (3.4), (3.5) and,
R =
∫ 1
0
rjdj (3.7)
N =
∫ 1
0
njdj (3.8)
where ρ > 0 denotes the constant rate of discount, with b, r, i ≥ 0 and n0 and A0
given.
3.3 Model without knowledge accumulation
We start out with the simple case of no knowledge accumulation or zero investment.
That is to say, a = 0 in (3.4). Because n does not change, this also implies that the
cost of the clean technology given by (3.3) remains constant.
We begin with this case for the following reason. Because there is only one state
variable A, it helps us to solve the entire path of energy use with relative ease. For
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a constant cost of the clean technology and depending on the value of the initial
environmental quality, we may get a situation of only using b or r until the unit cost
of the clean technology equals the shadow cost of environmental quality. From then
onwards, we would have simultaneous use of the two energy sources. So this case
with only one state variable allows us to trace the path from a situation of using only
one energy source to simultaneous use of the two energy sources which fits well with
reality.
3.3.1 Optimal solution
For the optimal solution, we impose the two aggregate consistency conditions, (R = r)
and (N = n). Because n˙ = 0 from (3.4), we can write N = n = 1 to simplify the
analysis. So cost of the clean technology given by (3.3) reduces to the difference
between a0 and a1. We assume an interior solution for r which implies that the
planner uses less than the feasible maximum of r¯ every period. We have two control
variables (b and r) and one state variable (A) for this case.
The planner maximizes (3.6) subject to (3.5) and (2.50). The current-valued
Hamiltonian of the problem is then
H = (b+ r)α − (a0 − a1)b− (A¯− A)2 + λ((A¯− A)γ − r) + θ1b+ θ2r + θ3(r¯ − r)
where λ is the shadow price of environmental quality and the θi’s denote the non-
negativity and the technology constraint on b and r, with λ, θ1, θ2, θ3 ≥ 0.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are
∂H
∂b
= α(b+ r)α−1 − (a0 − a1) + θ1 = 0, θ1b = 0 (3.9)
∂H
∂r
= α(b+ r)α−1 − λ+ θ2 − θ3 = 0, θ2r = 0, θ3(r¯ − r) = 0 (3.10)
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H
∂A
= (ρ+ γ)λ− 2(A¯− A) (3.11)
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and the transversality condition is given by
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ(t)A(t) = 0 (3.12)
Since the dirty and clean technologies are perfect substitutes in the above model,
they have equal marginal benefits. When only using the dirty technology, (0 < r <
r¯, b = 0⇒ θ2 = 0 = θ3, θ1 > 0), its optimum path is given by
r∗ =
(
α
λ
) 1
1−α
(3.13)
and,
λ = (a0 − a1)− θ1 (3.14)
Similarly, when only using the clean technology (b > 0, r = 0⇒ θ1 = 0 = θ3, θ2 > 0)
its optimum path is
b∗ =
(
α
a0 − a1
) 1
1−α
(3.15)
and,
λ = (a0 − a1) + θ2 (3.16)
So, when using both the energy sources, (b > 0, 0 < r < r¯ and θ1, θ2, θ3 = 0), we
have the condition
λ = (a0 − a1) (3.17)
Then from (3.2) we can write
e∗ =
(
α
λ
) 1
1−α
=
(
α
a0 − a1
) 1
1−α
(3.18)
It should be noted from the above equation that total energy used would be constant
in the case of simultaneous use of b and r.
The above cases imply that if λ > 0, we can get to a situation of simultaneous
use of b and r from using any one of the energy sources at first. Equations (3.14) and
(3.16) show that (3.17) can be satisfied starting from λ ≶ (a0 − a1).
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3.3.1.1 Conventional and modified steady state: Solving for the optimal
solution
This section deals with solving for the optimal solution using a phase diagram analy-
sis. We find motion trajectories that are feasible and satisfy the necessary conditions
for optimality. To check for the sufficient condition, we look at the transversality con-
dition given by (3.12). If we find paths which satisfy both these conditions, we say
such paths are optimal. We first define a “conventional steady state” and a “modified
steady state ”in this regard.
Figure 3.1 shows a stylized version of the stationary loci, the stable arms and
the levels of environmental quality. In Figure 3.1(a), the point of intersection of the
Figure 3.1 Conventional and modified steady state
stationary loci for (3.5) and (3.11) is referred to as the conventional steady state. It
is denoted by point S. Given (3.17), the above figure shows that we would only use
the clean technology above the line (a0 − a1), the dirty technology below it, and any
combination of b and r along the line. A0 and A
′
0 denote possible initial given levels
of environmental quality (we demonstrate these two cases in one graph for an easier
read; both cases are shown separately in the final section on technical details). For a
constant unit cost of the clean technology above the shadow price of environmental
quality implied at the conventional steady state, we show stable arms approaching
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point S from either its south-east or north-west. In this case, the transversality
condition given by (3.12) is satisfied.
When the initial stock of environmental quality is relatively high (at A0), only the
dirty technology is used along the stable arm until we approach S in infinite time.
Since λ is rising in this region, this means decreasing use of the dirty technology over
time according to (3.13). However, for a lower level of environmental quality A′0, we
may have two stable arms approaching the conventional steady state from its north-
west. Depending on our choice of λ0, we may have a sequence of using the clean and
then the dirty technology or only the dirty technology until we approach S in infinite
time. Since A rises at a faster rate when r = 0, the stable arm in the former case will
be relatively flat and then steep as we approach the conventional steady state.
Intuitively, the magnitude of the shadow price of environmental quality relative to
that of the constant unit cost of the clean technology is what determines a planner’s
decision of whether to use the dirty or the clean technology. For a relatively pristine
level of environmental quality, the value of its additional unit on lifetime utility (λ), is
small. Hence it would be economical for the planner to use only the dirty technology
until λ rises upto the level of the constant cost of the clean technology. At this point,
the planner would use a mix of r and b in constant proportions. The economy can
stay at this steady state forever as the dirty technology is inexhaustible. Conversely,
when environmental quality is poor to begin with, the present value of its marginal
increment on lifetime utility maybe greater than than the unit cost of the clean
technology making it cheaper for the planner to use only the clean energy input. It
may however switch to the dirty technology again if environmental quality improves
much lowering its shadow price.
The more interesting case involves when the line (a0−a1) is below the conventional
steady state. This situation is depicted by Figure 3.1(b). We once again show two
possible initial endowments of environmental quality A0 and A
′
0 in one graph for an
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easier demonstration. Here the stationary locus for (3.5) is truncated at λ = (a0−a1):
since we only use the clean technology for any λ > (a0 − a1), the A˙ = 0 locus will
coincide with A = A¯ at the pristine level of environmental quality. It can be shown
that point E can be made a steady state at which λ˙ = A˙ = 0. We call point E
the modified steady state. Given λ˙ = 0 at E, the motion of A can be set equal to
zero through an appropriate choice of r at any point along the open interval DP .
From (3.17), we would also get simultaneous use of r and b along this interval. The
co-ordinates at point E are denoted as (Aˆ ,λˆ).
The choice of r that makes A˙ = 0 along the interval DP can be obtained from
(3.5) and imposing the aggregate consistency condition (R = r) as
r∗ = γ(A¯− Aˆ) (3.19)
Note that λˆ = (a0 − a1) at E. From (3.18) we can then obtain the path of the clean
technology as a residual
b∗ = e∗ − r∗ (3.20)
Figure 3.1(b) shows that the modified steady state E can be approached from either
its north-west or south-east as indicated by the motion trajectories. Depending on the
given initial stock of environmental quality, the above figure shows two stable arms
approaching E from either of these directions. It can be shown that both these stable
arms are unique and that they approach E from either direction in finite time. The
system would stay at E forever to satisfy transversality which would be explained
again later. If we however allow the stable arms to proceed further, it will either
divert to the south-west or north-east as shown by the dashed arrows.
If the system starts at a relatively pristine level of environmental quality, that
is a high A0 near A¯, then there exists an optimum initial λ (or λ∗0) such that the
motion trajectory originating from (A0, λ∗0) becomes perfectly horizontal at E and
then proceeds towards its south-west. A falls and λ rises along this stable arm until
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it hits the modified steady state. For a choice of λ0 < λ∗0 given A0, the system would
follow a motion trajectory that would hit the λ˙ = 0 locus at a point below E and
then proceed towards its south-west. If λ0 > λ∗0, then the motion trajectory will hit a
point on the open interval DP towards the right of E after which it proceeds towards
its north-east. Similarly, if the system begins with poor environmental quality at A′0,
then we can also find a unique λ∗0 such that the stable arm originating from (A
′
0, λ
∗
0)
becomes perfectly horizontal at E and then proceeds towards its north-east. Any
other choice of λ0 would result in the motion trajectory intersecting the λ˙ = 0 locus
either above E or towards the left of it on the open interval DP . The path would
then either proceed towards the north-east or south-west of the modified steady state.
If we begin with a stock of environmental quality at A0, only r would be used
along the stable arm until it gets infinitesimally close to E. The growth of λ along
the stable arm implies decreasing use of the dirty technology by (3.13). However,
at this point, there is a jump in the control r such that its path changes to (3.19).
The path of b is given by (3.20). Given Aˆ is constant at the modified steady state
E, (3.19) and (3.20) imply that r∗ and b∗ are both constants. In addition, because
of a constant λˆ, the transversality condition (3.12) would be satisfied. Since such
a plan of only using the dirty technology at first and then a mix of the clean and
dirty technologies is feasible and satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for
optimality, we say that such a plan is optimal. The system would finally settle at E
and stay there forever.
Similarly, given A′0, only the clean technology b would be used along the stable
arm at the constant rate given by (3.15) until we get infinitesimally close to E. The
path of b then jumps to (3.20) and the path of r jumps from zero to (3.19). We can
then follow the previous analysis and show that the transversality condition (3.12)
would be satisfied. Such a plan would also be optimal.
Figure 3.2 shows the optimal paths for e, b and r over a long period of time if
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we begin at A0. In Figure 3.2, the paths of e and r coincide when we only use the
Figure 3.2 Energy use given constant average cost of b
dirty technology as we approach the modified steady state. Since the shadow price
of environmental quality λ rises during this period, r falls according to (3.13). As we
do not use the clean technology, the path of b coincides with the horizontal axis. At
the modified steady state, total energy use becomes constant by (3.18) and r jumps
down to its new constant profile given by (3.19). So b jumps up from zero to make
up the difference: this is given by the constant path (3.20).
We solve for the optimal solution using numerical methods given the values for
the parameters. As would be defined again later, we denote by Tˆ the time it takes for
the stable arm to reach E starting either from a relatively high or low initial stock of
environmental quality. The final section on technical details provides the necessary
numerical solutions.
3.3.2 Competitive equilibrium solution
We now turn to the competitive equilibrium solution of the above model. In the
equilibrium solution, each firm believes its action has only a negligible impact on the
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total use of the dirty technology. Thus firms treat R from (2.50) as given. So they
do not take account of their individual actions on the deterioration of environmental
quality and hence λ becomes irrelevant in this case. Since the dirty technology is
in infinite supply and its free, firms would use the maximum feasible amount r¯ each
period. The clean technology with a postive marginal cost would never be used in
the equilibrium solution. So the whole problem reduces to a static one in which each
firm uses a constant amount of r every period.
A representative firm j in equilibrium maximizes (3.6) subject to (3.5) and (2.50).
The current-valued Hamiltonian for the equilibrium solution is given by
H = (b+ r)α − (a0 − a1)b− (A¯− A)2 + θ1b+ θ2r + θ3(r¯ − r)
with θ1, θ2, θ3 ≥ 0.
As compared to the social planner solution, the f.o.c. with respect to r changes
while that with respect to b is given by (3.9). However, since firms never use the clean
technology this would not be important. Equations (3.11) and (3.12) are irrelevant
in this case.
The f.o.c. with respect to r now becomes
α(b+ r)α−1 + θ2 − θ3 = 0, θ2r = 0, θ3(r¯ − r) = 0 (3.21)
As firms use r = r¯ each period and (r > 0, b = 0 ⇒ θ2 = 0, θ1 > 0), the solution for
θ3 can be deduced from the above condition as
θ3 = α(r¯)α−1 (3.22)
The solution for θ1 is then given by
θ1 = (a0 − a1)− θ3 (3.23)
The behavior of firms in the equilibrium solution would however significantly reduce
environmental quality. But a high constant rate of regeneration γ may stabilize
environmental quality at some level A˜.
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Imposing r = r¯ in (3.5) and setting A˙ = 0 we get
A˜ = A¯− r¯
γ
(3.24)
Figure 3.3 shows the dynamics of A for the equilibrium solution. A positive intercept
Figure 3.3 Transitional dynamics of A in
equilibrium
in Figure 3.3 implies γ > r¯
A¯
. We assume a r¯ such that this inequality holds and A˜ > 0
(r¯ might also be so high that A˜ < 0). The arrows indicate the direction of movement
to the stationary state A˜ if we start with relatively high environmental quality at A0.
Similarly, for a low initial stock of A, environmental quality would move down along
the A˙ locus to the stationary state A˜. Given the parameter values in the final section
on technical details, it can be seen that A˜ < Aˆ.
3.4 Model with knowledge accumulation
In this section we solve the full model where investments in knowledge reduce the
average cost of the clean technology. A representative firm j maximizes (3.6) subject
to (3.4), (3.5), (2.50) and (2.8). We use phase diagram analysis to solve the model.
Interestingly, similar results are obtained as in the case where there was no knowledge
accumulation: depending on the initial stock of environmental quality, we may get a
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situation of only using the dirty or clean technology followed by simultaneous use of
the two after a certain point in time.
3.4.1 Optimal solution
We start out with the planner solution as in the previous model. We once again
assume an interior solution for use of the dirty technology or r < r¯. Imposing the
aggregate consistency conditions (R = r) and (N = n) in the above model, the
current-valued Hamiltonian is given by
H = (b+ r)α − (a0 − a1n) b− i− (A¯−A)2 + µa
√
i+ λ((A¯− A)γ − r)
+ θ1b+ θ2r + θ3(r¯ − r) + θ4i
where λ and µ denote the shadow prices of stocks of environmental quality and
knowledge. The θi’s have the same interpretation as before, with λ, µ, θi ≥ 0.
The f.o.c’s with respect to r and λ are given by (2.10) and (3.11). The other
necessary conditions for an optimal solution are
∂H
∂b
= α(b+ r)α−1 − (a0 − a1n) + θ1 = 0, θ1b = 0 (3.25)
∂H
∂i
= −1 + µa
2
√
i
+ θ4 = 0, θ4i = 0 (3.26)
µ˙ = ρµ− ∂H
∂n
= ρµ− a1b (3.27)
the transversality conditions are given by (3.12) and,
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµ(t)n(t) = 0 (3.28)
The above necessary conditions imply that investment is always positive in the
model. With the introduction of knowledge accumulation, (3.26) implies that the
marginal benefit of investment for i = 0 is infinity compared to a constant marginal
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cost of one. From (3.26), we also see that θ4 = −∞ when i = 0 which is not possible.
So substituting θ4 = 0 in (3.26) we get
n˙ = a
√
i = µa
2
2 (3.29)
The optimum path for use of the dirty technology (0 < r < r¯, b = 0 ⇒ θ2 = 0 =
θ3, θ1 > 0) is given by (3.13) as without knowledge accumulation. But (3.14) now
changes to
λ = (a0 − a1n)− θ1 (3.30)
When only using the clean technology (b > 0, r = 0,⇒ θ1 = 0 = θ3, θ2 > 0), its
optimal path is given by
b∗ =
(
α
a0 − a1n
) 1
1−α
(3.31)
which implies,
λ = (a0 − a1n) + θ2 (3.32)
So, when using both r and b (b > 0, 0 < r < r¯ and θ1, θ2, θ3 = 0), the condition
for simultaneous use can be written as
λ = (a0 − a1n) (3.33)
Then from (3.2) we get,
e∗ =
(
α
λ
) 1
1−α
=
(
α
a0 − a1n
) 1
1−α
(3.34)
The above two equations are similar to those for the case without knowledge accu-
mulation. However, since both λ and n change over time in the current model, the
relative magnitudes of these changes would be important. This would determine the
time of switch from only using the dirty technology or the clean one to periods of
simultaneous use of the two energy inputs.
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3.4.1.1 Solving for the optimal solution
The method of solving for the optimal solution in the current model would be anal-
ogous to that followed in the model without knowledge accumulation. Given the
parameters of the model, we assume a = 1 as a simplification.
The relevant figure for this model is given by Fig 3.4. It shows a stylized version
of the modified steady state when we include knowledge accumulation. We would
Figure 3.4 Transitional dynamics of (A, λ)
with investment in knowledge
henceforth refer to the line (a0 − a1n) as the “cost line.” Since n reaches its maximal
level at n = n¯, the cost line ceases to fall after it equals (a0−a1n¯). Investment becomes
zero (i = 0) beyond this point and the shadow price of the stock of knowledge (µ)
becomes moot in this case. The intersection of the (a0 − a1n¯) line with the λ˙ = 0
locus gives us a possible steady state. Given a significantly large n¯ where we can
possibly use the clean technology, we assume the above point of intersection to be
below point S in Figure 3.1(a). Following our logic as in the previous model, we
can make this point of intersection the modified steady state. Note that the cost
line would take a finite time to become equal to (a0 − a1n¯) starting from its level at
(a0 − a1n0).
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Figure 3.4 shows stable arms approaching the modified steady state Z either from
its south-east or north-west depending on the given initial stock of environmental
quality. It is clear from the above figure that the analysis with knowledge accumula-
tion and an upper bound on the stock of knowledge n¯, is very similar to the previous
model. However, the rate at which the cost line (a0− a1n) falls over time will be key
to our analysis. From (3.27) and (3.29) this rate is given by µ. In Figure 3.4 we see
that, given we start with relatively high or low environmental quality, there exists an
optimal choice of λ0 such that the stable arm hits the falling cost line only at the point
Z on the λ˙ = 0 locus. We denote this optimal choice of λ0 by λ∗0. Note that both
the transversality conditions (3.12) and (3.28) are satisfied at the modified steady
state Z. The profit-maximizing social planner would compare the shadow price of
environmental quality (λ) with the constant unit cost of the clean technology and use
the two energy inputs only when their marginal costs are equal. The economy can
stay at this steady state forever as the dirty technology is inexhaustible. We see that
λ˙ = A˙ = 0 and investment falls to zero at Z when n = n¯. Here the shadow price of
the stock of knowledge µ jumps to zero from (3.29).
The uniqueness of the stable arm when we begin with a relatively high stock of
environmental quality at A0 can be illustrated by the following two cases:
1. λ0 > λ∗0: In this case, the motion trajectory would intersect the cost line towards
the right of the stationary locus (λ˙ = 0). This would happen for n < n¯ and in
the special case of n = n¯. Let us call the time it takes for the motion trajectory
to intersect the cost line as t1. Since the cost line still keeps falling for n < n¯,
this implies that the motion trajectory would be above the cost line from the
very next instant. The motion trajectory would then proceed to the north-east.
For the knife-edge case of n = n¯, any slight disturbance at t1 would also take
the motion trajectory to the north-east so that λ shoots to infinity in finite
time.
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2. λ0 < λ∗0: For an initial value of the shadow price of environmental quality below
its optimal level, the motion trajectory would hit the λ˙ = 0 locus before the
cost line reaches the level (a0− a1n¯) at a point below Z. Let us call t2 the time
it takes for the motion trajectory to hit the stationary locus λ˙ = 0. Then from
the next instant t2 + , the motion trajectory would proceed to the south-west
and intersect the horizontal axis in finite time.
For a relatively low initial stock of environmental quality at A′0, λ∗0 has to be
significantly above (a0 − a1n0) or the initial cost of the clean technology. This point
deserves special mention. In this case, the policy function “catches” the falling cost
line from above only at the point Z. For a lower level of λ0, the motion trajectory
may cross the falling cost line soon enough at a level of n < n¯ after which the point
on the trajectory will find itself below the cost line. The trajectory would then head
to the south-west. The only way the motion trajectory can turn around and proceed
to the south-east again towards Z is if it intersects the falling cost line and the cost
line falls at a rate quicker than the point on the trajectory. In this case, the point on
the trajectory would again be above the falling cost line.
The uniqueness of λ∗0 can be proven in a similar way to the case for a relatively
high stock of environmental quality. For λ0 > λ∗0 > (a0−a1n0), the motion trajectory
would intersect the λ˙ = 0 locus sooner than the cost line reaches the level when
n = n¯. The motion trajectory would then proceed to the north-east in such a way
that the shadow price of environmental quality would tend to infinity in finite time.
For (a0−a1n0) < λ0 < λ∗0, the time path would hit a point to the left of the modified
steady state Z on the cost line when it falls to its minimal level at n = n¯. From the
very next instant, the time path would proceed to the south-west and intersect the
horizontal axis in finite time.
So, if we begin with a stock of environmental quality at A0, only the dirty tech-
nology is used according to (3.13) until the stable arm gets infinitesimally close to Z.
92
This is evident from Figure 3.4. At Z, r jumps to its new profile given by (3.19). The
path of the clean technology is obtained from the residual of (3.34) and (3.19) with
n replaced by n¯. Similarly, for a low level of environmental quality at A′0, we would
only use the clean technology along the stable arm as long as it is above the falling
cost line. Since the two only intersect at the modified steady state Z, the path of b
would be given by (3.31) until the stable arm gets infinitesimally close to Z. At this
point r jumps from zero to its new path given by (3.19). Once again, the path of the
clean technology is obtained from the residual of (3.34) and (3.19).
The next question deals with the optimal choice of µ0 given the unique λ∗0 found
above for a high or low initial stock of environmental quality. Given (A0, λ∗0) or (A
′
0,
λ∗0) and using (3.5) and (3.11), we can find the time that it takes the stable arm to
reach Z. We denote this time as Tˆ . Given Tˆ , there is a unique µ0 that will drive the
cost line down from (a0 − a1n0) to (a0 − a1n¯) in exactly Tˆ years. We refer to this
optimal choice of µ0 as µ∗0.
To verify, we can use µ∗0 to find the time T¯ it takes for the cost line to reach
(a0−a1n¯) starting from (a0−a1n0). Given Aˆ, we can assume A0 ≶ Aˆ or A′0 ≶ Aˆ. We
can then find a λˆ0 such that a motion trajectory originating from (A0, λˆ0) or (A
′
0, λˆ0)
hits the cost line at n = n¯ in exactly T¯ years. If λˆ0 equals λ∗0 found above, we can
say that there exists a unique µ∗0 given λ∗0. Numerical solutions for the optimal initial
values of the co-states and the time it takes for the stable arms to reach the modified
steady state are provided in the final section on technical details.
3.4.2 Competitive equilibrium solution
We now turn to the competitive equilibrium for the above model. The solution would
look exactly like the one without knowledge accumulation. Since a representative firm
treats the aggregate flow of the dirty technology (R) as constant, it does not take into
account the negative external effect of its own use of r on the stock of environmental
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quality. Firms would always use the dirty technology and extract the maximum
feasible amount r¯ every period. Since the relatively expensive clean technology is
never used, i = 0 and the stock of knowledge would stay at its initial level n0. The
state variables for the model, that is λ and µ, would both be irrelevant in this case.
That implies (3.12) and (3.28) are also not needed for this static model.
The objective function for a representative firm in the equilibrium solution is then
given by
H = (b+ r)α −
(
a0 − a1(N1−βnβ)
)
b− (A¯− A)2 + θ1b+ θ2r + θ3(r¯ − r)
with θi ≥ 0. The initial condition and the parameters of the system are the same as
in the social planner solution.
As firms never use the clean technology and do not invest in knowledge, the only
control is then use of the dirty technology or r. Maximizing the above expression
with respect to r, we get (3.21) as before. Imposing r = r¯ in (3.21) we get (3.22). As
in the model without knowledge accumulation, environmental quality will stabilize at
some level A˜ given by (3.24). The dynamics of A is given by Figure 3.3. Once again,
we can reach the stationary state starting from a high or low level of environmental
quality.
3.5 Conclusion
We assume an economy consisting of a continuum of identical firms. Each firm is
owned by an infinitely lived household. For purposes of simplicity, there is no pop-
ulation growth in our model. A representative firm produces energy using an inex-
haustible natural resource and a backstop technology. To keep the model tractable,
we assume away input costs of the resource. The structure of the model is such that
the free resource causes environmental pollution while there is a positive average cost
associated with using the backstop. Private investments in knowledge at the firm
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level can however reduce the average cost of the backstop technology. Due to the
polluting and non-polluting nature of the resource and the backstop, we refer to the
two energy sources as dirty and clean technologies respectively.
The main result of the paper lies in the difference between the optimal and equi-
librium solutions. We find that the social planner would always invest in knowledge
to reduce average backstop costs by a little amount every period. Depending on the
initial stock of environmental quality, the planner would initially use only one of the
energy sources and gradually converge to a steady state where the two energy inputs
are used in constant proportions. On the other hand, in the equilibrium solution, a
representative firm does not realize the negative external effects of its own resource
use on the stock of environmental quality. A firm would always only use the dirty
technology and never switch to the clean one. There will be radical underinvestment
by a representative firm as it will never invest any amount in knowledge to reduce
backtop costs. Environmental quality would keep falling in this case and may settle
at some level if there is a high enough rate of environmental regeneration.
The optimal solution is intuitive in the sense that if society is endowed with
a relatively pristine (poor) level of environmental quality, its shadow price would
be relatively less (more) compared to the average cost of the backstop technology.
Hence the planner would use only the resource (backstop) in decreasing (increasing)
amounts until the marginal costs of the two energy inputs become equal. We call
this the long run steady state where the economy stays forever at a constant level
of environmental quality. With investment in knowledge continually reducing the
average cost of the backstop, we show that this steady state also corresponds with
the maximal level of the stock of knowledge after which investment falls to zero. We
assume average backstop costs to fall as much in this situation so as to make its use
economical anyway.
A possible extension to work on for the future would be including resource ex-
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haustibility to our model. Given a relatively pristine endowment of environmental
quality, the optimal solution may involve exhausting the resource at the same time
that the knowledge stock reaches its maximal level. In the long run, the planner
would use a constant amount of the backstop technology forever. On the other hand,
for a relatively poor initial stock of environmental quality, our intuition suggests that
the planner would first use the backtop, followed by a mix of the two energy inputs
before completely switching to the backstop at the time of exhaustion of the resource.
Another avenue would be to introduce a tax or a correction mechanism (as in Boven-
berg and Smulders (1996), Grimaud and Rougé (2005, 2008)) to bring the equilibrium
solution closer to the socially optimal one.
3.6 Some technical details supporting this chapter
We use the parameter values α = 0.33, a0 = 10, a1 = 0.002, A¯ = 2, r¯ = 0.017,
A0 = 1.99, A
′
0 = 0.8, n0 = 0.01, n¯ = 1000, γ = 0.01 and ρ = 0.04. We use
Mathematica to compute the numerical solutions for the above models. The co-
ordinates of S or the conventional steady state in Figure 3.1(a) is given by AS = 1.64
and λS = 14.35.
For the model without knowledge accumulation, Figure 3.5 shows the two possible
cases when the stock of environmental quality begins at a relatively high or low level.
The co-ordinates of E or the modified steady state in Figure 3.5 are Aˆ = 1.75 and
λˆ = 9.998 given the above parameter values. We find the stable arms using numerical
methods and by working our way backwards.
A similar analysis would follow when investments in knowledge are included to
reduce the average cost of the clean technology. However, in this case, the cost line
given by (a0 − a1n) falls over time as n increases from n0 to n¯. Figure 3.6 shows the
corresponding stable arms as it meets the falling cost line at the modified steady state
Z. The co-ordinates of the modified steady state Z in Figure 3.6 are Aˆ = 1.8 and
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Figure 3.5 Transitional dynamics of (A, λ) with no knowledge accumulation
Figure 3.6 Transitional dynamics of (A, λ) with investment in knowledge
λˆ = 8. We use numerical methods in Mathematica to find the stable arms. Given
n = n¯, we get λˆ = (a0−a1n¯). Setting λ˙ = 0 from (3.11), this gives us Aˆ. We find the
stable arms by working our way backwards from Z(Aˆ, λˆ). Their point of intersection
with the initial stock of A gives us the unique λ∗0. We find µ∗0 using (3.27), (3.29) and
(3.31) such that the cost line falls to (a0 − a1n¯) at the same time as the stable arms
reach Z.
Table 3.1 summarizes the numerical solutions of the two models when the average
cost of the clean technology was constant and when it could be reduced through
investments in the stock of knowledge. Given the above parameters, we notice some
significant differences based on the initial stock of A for each of the two models. When
we only use the dirty technology for a high initial level of A, we get to the modified
steady state relatively soon compared to only using the clean technology given A′0.
This also implies a high µ∗0 for the model with knowledge accumulation. So we would
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Table 3.1 Optimal values when only r or b is used for the two models
Model without knowledge with knowledge
accumulation accumulation
A0 (only r) λ∗0 = 5.71 , Tˆ = 36.94 λ∗0 = 5.48 , Tˆ = 20.71, µ∗0 = 62.01
A
′
0 (only b) λ∗0 = 40.0007 , Tˆ = 156.88 λ∗0 = 40.0002 , Tˆ = 179.18, µ∗0 = 0.062
have a smaller µ∗0 given a low endowment of environmental quality.
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